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Abstract 
 
Close to two-thirds of the global passenger air traffic is handled by the three global airline allianc-
es: Star Alliance, OneWorld, and SkyTeam. The residual traffic is handled by non-aligned carriers, 
including two of the most successful airlines of recent years: the gulf carriers Etihad Airways and 
Emirates. Both airlines are very fastidious in terms of partner selection and voice several concerns 
in regards to global airline alliances. Considering the importance and success of these alliances in 
the aviation industry, these positions seem paradox. Several studies exist that summarize motiva-
tions and downsides of joining an alliance, but, at the same time, the literature is lacking a system-
ic synthesis of perceived benefits and perils. 
 
This study contributes to existing literature by generating a summary of the extensive body of 
knowledge on strategic alliances and synthesizing its perspectives on the motivations and down-
sides of allying; a domain that has not been addressed previously. In addition, the analysis has not 
only yielded insights to the different motivations and downsides of joining an alliance, but also to 
the theoretical lenses most commonly used when analyzing the motives and downsides. Moreover, 
a step further is taken to evaluate the applicability of this literature and its insights concerning the 
motivations and downsides of allying to the specific context of aviation. Based on theoretical in-
sights and an empirical case study of the gulf carriers, propositions concerning the criteria that 
influence the company-specific decision related to allying and factors influencing the design/ 
structure and outcome of the cooperation are developed. Multiple sources of evidence are used in 
the case study, such as interview transcripts, reports from leading industry magazines, newspaper 
articles, and the annual reports of the companies involved. 
 
The multiple-case study suggests that the risk of partner dependency and management specific 
views are important factors for the gulf carriers and influence the decision to (not) join an alliance. 
While prior literature gives little indication, which factors specifically influence the airline’s per-
ception of motivations and downsides in the aviation industry, this study hypothesizes several un-
derlying factors for the alliance decision, namely: the airline cost structure, network structure, 
target passenger group, alliance type, alliance governance, and partner characteristics. The study 
also provides some practical insights for management: the most likely scenario of the further 
evolvement of the airline industry seems to be a slow, but steady, deregulation of the industry, 
while joint venturing and closer collaboration becomes increasingly important. The study proposes 
that it is important for management in the airline business to closely observe the developments 
and assess the increasingly feasible option to joint venture, which was not available when the glob-
al airline alliances were founded. 
 
Keywords  strategic alliances, multilateral alliances, multi-partner alliances, motivations, upsides, 
motives, downsides, cooperation, aviation, airline, gulf carrier, network carrier 
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1 Introduction 
The market share of alliances in the aviation industry is exceptionally high. Close to 
two-thirds (63.8%) of the global passenger air traffic is handled by the three global airline 
alliances: Star Alliance (24.0%), OneWorld (19.0%) and SkyTeam (20.8%) (Dunn, 2015). 
The residual 36.2% is handled by non-aligned carriers, including two of the most success-
ful airlines of recent years: gulf carriers1 Etihad Airways and Emirates. The group of “gulf 
carriers” describes the three major carriers based in the gulf region and, besides the afore-
mentioned Etihad Airways and Emirates, includes Qatar Airways (Dresner, Eroglu, Hofer, 
Mendez, & Tan, 2015; Squalli, 2014). Instead of joining a global airline alliance, like the 
majority of major carriers do, Etihad Airways and Emirates build their own partner net-
works, while being very fastidious in terms of partner selection. Emirates voices the con-
cern that joining a global airline alliance would be a threat to its independence, flexibility, 
reputation and high quality of service, while Etihad Airways promotes its strategy of spe-
cific investments in strategically important regions (Heasley, 2010; Hogan, 2013). 
Considering the importance and success of the global airline alliances in the aviation in-
dustry, these positions seem paradox. Interestingly, this is not simply due to the carriers’ 
location in the gulf area, as the also successful third gulf carrier Qatar Airways is a mem-
ber of the oneworld alliance. This suggests that there are more criteria influencing the stra-
tegic decision of Etihad Airways and Emirates to go against the trend and not join a global 
airline alliance than merely the location. 
Research has examined different motivations and downsides of joining bilateral and multi-
lateral strategic alliances that might be of relevance for carriers facing the decision to either 
join a global airline alliance or stay autonomous. On the one hand, Mariti and Smiley 
(1983) suggest economies of scale as an important motive to cooperate, Kogut (1988) pro-
poses that firms try to change the competitive landscape through collusion, and Dyer and 
Singh (1998) suggest knowledge exchange as a motive for allying. Furthermore, Barney, 
Wright, and Ketchen (2001) emphasize the importance of access to new resources and 
Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) name uncertainty avoidance and the sharing of 
operational risks as very important factors. On the other hand, Hamel (1991) cautions for 
                                                
1 The term gulf carrier, as it is used in this study, is also referred to as the Middle East big three carriers or 
MEB3 and can be used interchangeably. 
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unintended knowledge transfer, Gomes-Casseres (1994) names the burden of negotiating 
decisions and difficulties in coordination, and Gulati (1998) mentions opportunism as a 
potential risk of an alliance. Overall, collaboration in the form of a strategic alliance is seen 
positively and therefore suggests that this form of cooperation is beneficial for carriers.  
Although several studies exist that summarize motivations and downsides of joining an 
alliance (e.g. Dong & Glaister, 2006; Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Hagedoorn, Link, & 
Vonortas, 2000; Nielsen, 2003), the literature is lacking a systemic synthesis of perceived 
benefits and perils. First, the downsides of allying are undervalued, and there is an obvious 
contradiction between theory and what can be seen to happen in the industry empirically. 
Second, the theory on the benefits of allying stems from diverse streams, and a synthesis of 
literature based on a coherent theoretical base is still missing. However, this knowledge is 
fundamental for future research in the field of strategic alliances. It fills the research gap of 
to what extent, and how, these motivations and downsides apply to the gulf carriers. 
Recent research in the field of air transportation has analyzed the effect of gulf carriers on 
US airlines (Dresner et al., 2015) and German airlines (Grimme, 2011), the impact of avia-
tion growth in the middle east and its effect on the strategies of network carriers 
(Vespermann, Wald, & Gleich, 2008), the effect of complementary and substitute network 
resources on alliance value (Wassmer, Li, & Madhok, 2015), and the effects of joining a 
strategic alliance on airline efficiency, productivity and profitability (Lin, 2013). Only very 
few sources, such as Button, Haynes, and Stough (1998) and Morrish and Hamilton 
(2002), provide examples for the motivations of joining an alliance. They suggest market 
access through codeshares2 or the operation of a partner’s routes, higher load factors 
through new traffic feeds from a partner’s flights, and improvements through shared opera-
tions, e.g. IT, ground operations, or marketing. The three global airline alliances them-
selves communicate that they provide these benefits and, for example, promote joint cus-
tomer benefits, brand strengthening, as well as cost savings, and improved efficiency 
through joint initiatives (oneworld, 2016; SkyTeam, 2014b; Star Alliance, 2015). 
                                                
2 A codeshare agreement, allows airlines to offer flights under their name that are operated by a partner air-
line (codesharing partner). This offers passengers a larger variety of destinations while maintaining a simple 
booking process. 
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However, it is notable that the leadership teams from Emirates and Etihad Airways oppose 
the view of existing research and of the global airline alliances and propose the paradox 
argumentation that global airline alliances hinder growth and limit flexibility rather than 
enable and increase it, respectively. This raises the question of what the (potential) motiva-
tions and downsides of joining a global airline alliance are, how they can be explained the-
oretically, and to what extent their applicability may vary between different carriers. 
The study contributes to existing literature by generating a meta-analysis of the extensive 
body of knowledge on strategic alliances and synthesizing its perspectives on the motiva-
tions and downsides of allying; a domain that has not been addressed previously. Moreo-
ver, a step further is taken to evaluate the applicability of this literature and its insights 
concerning the motivations and downsides of allying to the specific context of aviation. 
Based on theoretical insights and an empirical case study of the gulf carriers, propositions 
concerning the criteria that influence the company-specific decision related to allying are 
developed. Furthermore, propositions concerning factors influencing the design, structure 
and outcome of the cooperation are deduced.  
This study is structured as follows: In chapter 2, a thorough systematic literature review is 
conducted in order to identify motives and downsides, as well as important alliance design 
decisions and parameters, such as the institutionalization, partner selection, governance 
and the similarities and differences in multilateral alliances. In chapter 3, important back-
ground information of the aviation industry is presented. This part covers the evolution of 
the industry, and highlights recent developments and the impact of deregulation and gov-
ernment subsidies. Next, the concepts of network and gulf carriers will be defined includ-
ing any alliance specificities relevant to their operating model, such as their network setup 
and expansion strategies. Finally, the cooperative structure of the aviation industry is char-
acterized and enriched with a description of the practicalities of and the difference between 
the three global airline alliances.  
Based on these insights, a conceptual framework of motivations and downsides related to 
joining multi-partner alliances will be developed in chapter 4, which is then applied to the 
individual gulf carriers in the form of a multiple-case study. The results are then summa-
rized and discussed with regard to underlying key factors, while propositions are devel-
oped. Finally, a summary of the results and potential for future research in this field is 
evaluated, including short evaluation of practical implications. 
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2 Past research on strategic alliances 
The formation of strategic alliances can be differentiated in a sequence of actions and deci-
sions. First, the general decision to form an alliance needs to be made, based on the thor-
ough evaluation of benefits and downsides that come with the alliance (Gulati, 1998). Af-
ter the motives and downsides are evaluated and the general decision to form an alliance is 
made, the next step in the sequence of setting up an alliance is deciding on the right institu-
tionalization and selecting a partner with a good fit. Finally, the alliance needs to be set up 
and adapted continuously during its evolution (Gulati, 1998). This literature review is 
structured according to the previously described steps of the process, with an emphasis on 
the motives and downsides because of the previously identified research gaps and the goal 
of the study. 
As described above, to understand why some gulf airlines avoid alliances, it is necessary to 
conduct an analysis of existing strategic alliance literature and to understand the motiva-
tions and downsides of joining an alliance from the perspective of different established 
theories. For this, an approach, similar to that used by Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) and 
Wassmer (2008), is followed. As a first step, peer-reviewed journal articles were re-
searched in the “business source complete” of the search engine EBSCO with at least one 
of the following keywords: 
strategic alliance benefits; strategic alliance advantages; strategic alliance objectives; 
strategic alliance motives; strategic alliance motivations; strategic alliance risks; strategic 
alliance downsides; strategic alliance costs 
These keywords were identified during an initial screening of relevant alliance literature. 
The search engine automatically searches for singular and plural forms of the search terms. 
The results were filtered to only include articles from the time span of the last 20 years 
(from 1995 to 2015), a time span that is, according to Wassmer (2008), often used in litera-
ture reviews and therefore also used in this paper. This search yielded 2,027 results overall. 
The search was then narrowed further down by limiting the results to journals with an A-
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ranking or higher, according to the VHB-JOURQUAL33. In the second step, titles and ab-
stracts of the identified articles were evaluated in terms of relevancy to the research prob-
lem. In case the title and abstract were inconclusive, a screening of the paper was conduct-
ed in order to determine its relevancy. Articles with irrelevant content were dismissed. In 
the third step, relevant articles were reviewed and systematically analyzed in terms of 
study type (e.g. empirical, theoretical or practitioner oriented), research question and prob-
lem, theoretical explanation used by the paper, focus (e.g. bilateral or multilateral), find-
ings of the study, relevant implications for the research question of this paper, and a sum-
mary of the motivations and/ or downsides identified. In addition, highly relevant refer-
ences to studies that were not included in the search results were noted and analyzed later 
according to the same scheme to ensure no key insights were overlooked. 
2.1 Classification and definitions 
Despite the fact that strategic alliances have been a strong research focus in the recent past, 
there is not yet a uniform definition. However, there is a general agreement on the main 
characteristics. Hence, for this master’s thesis the definition of “strategic alliance”, accord-
ing to one of the most cited sources, is a “voluntary arrangement between firms involving 
exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services. [Strategic 
alliances] can occur as a result of a wide range of motives and goals, take a variety of 
forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries” (Gulati, 1998, p. 293). When it 
comes to multiple alliances, the inconsistency of terms is even bigger. Therefore, in this 
study, the term “multilateral alliance” is used to describe formalized arrangements between 
multiple firms with a broad scope, while alliance networks are rather informal webs of 
bilateral connections between firms (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Lazzarini, 2008). From the per-
spective of one single airline, an alliance portfolio describes “a set of discrete bilateral alli-
ances” with different partners (Doz & Hamel, 1998, p. 222). 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives on strategic alliances 
The results of the literature review depicted in Table 1 show that the most common theo-
ries, used by scholars to explain the formation of strategic alliances, are the resource-based 
                                                
3 The VHB-JOURQUAL is a journal ranking of the parent organization of German university professors in 
the area of business administration “Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V.” (VHB). The 
most recent version 3 of the VHB-JOURQUAL, which was used for this study, can be accessed via: 
http://vhbonline.org/service/jourqual/vhb-jourqual-3/teilrating-abwl/ 
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view, organizational learning, social network theory and transaction cost theory. Besides 
these central theories, researchers use arguments from strategic management (such as com-
petitive force and dynamic capabilities), the knowledge-based view, the real options theory 
and the agency theory.  
Table 1: Theoretical perspectives on motivations and downsides in strategic alliance 
literature 
Theoretical lens Study 
Resource-based view Ahuja (2000); Barney et al. (2001); Baum et al. (2000); Chung, Singh, and 
Lee (2000); S. Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998); Dyer and Singh (1998); 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996); Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, and Santo-
ro (2008); Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza (2000); Hitt, Nixon, 
Clifford, and Coyne (1999); Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996); Shan, 
Walker, and Kogut (1994); Stuart (2000); Teng (2007); Vandaie and Zaheer 
(2014); Wang and Zajac (2007) 
Organizational 
learning 
Baum and Oliver (1991); Dyer and Nobeoka (2000); Glaister and Buckley 
(1996); Hagedoorn et al. (2000); Heimeriks, Duysters, and Vanhaverbeke 
(2007); Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000); Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, and Sparks (1998); Lavie, Lechner, and Singh (2007); Luo and 
Deng (2009); Sakakibara (1997) 
Social network 
theory 
Ahuja (2000); Ahuja, Polidoro Jr, and Mitchell (2009); Burt (2009); Chung 
et al. (2000); Gomes-Casseres (1994); Lazzarini (2007); Luo and Deng 
(2009); Mitchell and Singh (1996); Ozmel, Reuer, and Gulati (2013); Soh 
(2010); Stuart (2000); Stuart and Podolny (1996) 
Transaction cost 
theory 
T. K. Das and Teng (1996); Glaister and Buckley (1996); Gulati (1995); 
Hagedoorn et al. (2000); Hennart (1991); Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009); 
Luo and Deng (2009); Mudambi and Tallman (2010); Nooteboom, Berger, 
and Noorderhaven (1997); Parkhe (1993); Wassmer (2008) 
Knowledge-based 
view 
Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004); Mowery et al. (1996); Wang and Zajac 
(2007) 
Real options theory Folta (1998); Kogut (1991); Reuer and Tong (2010) 
Agency theory Ozmel et al. (2013); Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) 
Dynamic capabilities Hagedoorn et al. (2000) 
Evolutionary  
economics 
Singh and Mitchell (1996) 
Game theory Parkhe (1993) 
Industrial organiza-
tion economics 
Hagedoorn et al. (2000) 
Social capital theory Gopalakrishnan et al. (2008) 
Other economics Arora and Gambardella (1990); Bourdeau, Cronin Jr, and Voorhees (2007); 
Coombs and Deeds (2000); Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad (1989); Inkpen 
(2000); Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998); Mitchell, Dussauge, and Gar-
rette (2002); Singh (1997); Singh and Mitchell (2005) 
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The majority of studies are empirical in nature, and determine the alliance outcomes meas-
ured on the basis of one objective (e.g. knowledge sharing). Determining specific motives 
and downsides and their impact is seldom the main focus of a study (Glaister & Buckley, 
1996; Sakakibara, 1997). 
Some of these studies integrate two or more theories. Most common is a combination of 
the resource-based view and social network theory (Ahuja, 2000; Chung et al., 2000; Go-
palakrishnan et al., 2008; Stuart, 2000), but also a combination of organizational learning 
and transaction costs is applied (Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Luo & Deng, 2009). It is not 
surprising that there are also combinations of the resource-based view and knowledge-
based view, as the latter is an advancement of the resource-based view (Mowery et al., 
1996; Wang & Zajac, 2007). Finally, Ozmel et al. (2013) integrate the agency theory and 
social network theory in their study. 
The most common theoretical perspective used to analyze motivations and downsides of 
alliances is the resource-based view. This theory describes organizations as a bundle of 
strategically relevant resources, with which they are unequally equipped and the difference 
in this resource endowment is not easy to overcome. However, companies try to assimilate 
and combine resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Since resources with these 
configurations are hard to come by, organizations opt for inter-organizational cooperation 
to get, share, and exchange these strategically important resources. An alliance between 
companies can be a good way to access these resources quickly and also tap unused re-
sources. Depending on a company’s resource endowment, varying institutionalizations 
may be appropriate (T. K. Das & Teng, 2001). 
In contrast to this approach, the organizational learning theory suggests that learning in an 
organization is constituted by behavioral changes through the organization’s processing of 
information and experience (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991). It is rooted in the fields of 
psychology and cognitive research. The diffusion of knowledge in the organization hap-
pens by making the learning of the individual available to a broader audience, through stor-
ing and sharing. Different types of learning are present in organizational theory. Single-
loop learning is non-strategic in nature and is described as the lower-level learning, where 
errors are detected and corrected without a policy change. In comparison, the second type, 
double-loop learning, is a higher-level learning type and strategical in nature. When an 
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error is detected and corrected, the organization evaluates and adapts its established norms, 
procedures, policies, and objectives. This requires changes to the company’s knowledge-
base and competencies that are specific to the firm. Understanding how to foster learning 
facilitates the promotion of a learning culture within an organization (Argyris & Schön, 
1996). The concept of the learning organization is closely related to organizational learning 
theory and describes a firm that maximizes organizational learning through appropriate 
structures (Simonin, 1997). 
The third major relevant theoretical framework is the social network theory, which looks at 
how the embeddedness of participants within a network influences their own actions and 
outcomes, as well as others’ actions. Social network theory is positioned in between the 
polar opposites of the under-socialized view, meaning that the actions of an individual are 
completely based on the pursuit of self-interest, and the over-socialized view, meaning that 
the actions of an individual are completely based on societal values and norms 
(Granovetter, 1985). The social network theory can be applied to both the organizational 
level (e.g. alliances and joint ventures) and the individual level (e.g. career choices and 
aspirations). The key concept within the social network theory is social capital. It describes 
the resources that can be mobilized through the embeddedness of the actor within the (stra-
tegic) network, which enables the actor to access resources (e.g. information, knowledge or 
tangible goods) (Adler & Seok-Woo, 2002; Burt, 1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the resources that can be accessed is determined by the 
network structure: the relation of strong to weak ties. Strong ties, often based on cohesive 
contacts and an equivalent mindset, tend to provide redundant resources, but also facilitate 
trust between the partners in the network (Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1988, 1990). As opposed 
to high closure, a brokerage position in the network offers the chance to bridge structural 
holes and therefore connect previously unconnected segments of the network. In this case, 
weak ties offer a greater variety of different resources, as they are based on non-redundant 
contacts. (Burt, 1997, 2009; Granovetter, 1983). In the case of an alliance, the position 
within the network determines the heterogeneity of resources that can be accessed by a 
company. In order to be successful, Burt (2001, 2009) notes that both cohesiveness as well 
as the bridging of structural holes is essential for alliance success. 
Finally, the transaction cost theory suggests that the cost-optimal decision, in the case of no 
transaction costs, is buying instead of making (Williamson, 1979). The individual’s behav-
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ior is embossed by limited rationality and opportunism. Three characteristics determine the 
transaction costs: the frequency, uncertainty, and specificity of the exchanged goods. The 
more unfavorable these characteristics are, the more it makes sense to accept governance 
costs, for example in the form of a strategic alliance, in order to decrease transaction costs. 
The administrative costs of a transaction are the highest if a hierarchy is present. In the 
case of a market transaction, administrative costs are at their lowest, though the require-
ments in regards to the three characteristics are at their highest (Williamson, 1991). A stra-
tegic alliance is a hybrid form of market and hierarchy. Research differentiates between 
explicit knowledge, e.g. patents or designs, and implicit knowledge, e.g. know-how among 
employees. The transfer and integration of these intangible assets is a highly complex pro-
cess, with high transaction costs due to high uncertainty, because it is impossible to cover 
every possible variation in a contract. Because of that, alliances are generally superior to 
market contracts in integrating knowledge, especially under higher degrees of uncertainty 
(Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hagedoorn et al., 2000).  
2.3 Motivations for strategic alliances 
Research has provided a wide range of motives for joining an alliance. While some of the 
motives appear frequently, others overlap to a certain extent or are mentioned/ identified 
by only a few authors. Table 2 on the next page gives an overview of the categories, mo-
tives and studies that reference them. Of the studies analyzed, 57.2% analyzed the motiva-
tions, 28.5% analyze both motivations and downsides and only 14.3% focus on downsides 
of allying. To provide a better overview, this paper uses four categories to cluster the mo-
tives according to their aims: innovation, market consolidation, business expansion, and 
business operation. The category innovation includes all motivations related to new prod-
uct development and knowledge sharing. The market consolidation category includes those 
that aim at changing the market environment by increasing the company’s market power 
and/ or position through cooperation with other companies. Business expansion related 
motives include new market entries, as well as international expansion and all factors asso-
ciated with these. Finally, business operation includes motivations that influence the day-
to-day business of the company, such as marketing alliances or shared services. 
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Table 2: Motivations in strategic alliance literature 
Cat. Motive Study 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Share knowledge and capabilities 
Exchange complementary assets 
Distribute risks and share costs 
Ahuja (2000); Arora and Gambardella (1990); 
Barney et al. (2001); Chung et al. (2000); Ei-
senhardt and Schoonhoven (1996); Glaister 
and Buckley (1996); Gopalakrishnan et al. 
(2008); Hagedoorn et al. (2000); Hennart 
(1991); Hitt et al. (1999); Nooteboom et al. 
(1997); Stuart (2000); Teng (2007); Vandaie 
and Zaheer (2014); Wang and Zajac (2007) 
C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
Improve legitimacy and reputation 
Influence competitive landscape 
Ensure opportunity to acquire target 
Baum and Oliver (1991); Bourdeau et al. 
(2007); Chung et al. (2000); Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996); Folta (1998); Glaister 
and Buckley (1996); Hagedoorn et al. (2000); 
Hamel et al. (1989); Lazzarini (2007); Noote-
boom et al. (1997); Ozmel et al. (2013); Soh 
(2010); Stuart (2000) 
Ex
pa
ns
io
n 
Enter new markets 
Expand internationally 
Conform to foreign government policy 
Baum et al. (2000); Glaister and Buckley 
(1996); Kogut (1991); Nooteboom et al. 
(1997); Reuer and Ragozzino (2006); Reuer 
and Tong (2005); Singh and Mitchell (2005) 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
Increase efficiency and realize synergies 
Share capital 
Glaister and Buckley (1996); Gopalakrishnan 
et al. (2008); Gulati (1999); Hagedoorn et al. 
(2000); Kogut (1991); Mitchell et al. (2002); 
Reuer and Ragozzino (2006); Sakakibara 
(1997) 
 
A more detailed explanation of the motives is set out below according to the structure of 
table 2. 
Innovation 
Share knowledge and capabilities 
Alliances allow companies to share their complementary skill sets and talents which can 
cover a broad variety of different areas and ultimately lead to a competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). This new and unique combination of knowledge has 
the potential to lead to the development of new products and services that one company 
alone could not have done (Contractor & Lorange, 1988). This combination can further-
more realize a significant decrease in new product development times, and it becomes es-
pecially interesting if the companies operate in different industries (Gomes-Casseres, 
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1994). From a transaction cost theory perspective, Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) point out 
that knowledge integration processes in an alliance are generally much more efficient than 
market contracts, only inferior to a single firm. In the case of a multilateral alliance, firms 
can profit from the broad range of knowledge of the companies involved, as it is stored and 
can be accessed by an individual firm on the network level (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). 
Exchange and access complementary assets 
Strategic alliances, in research, are often mentioned to be a means to exchange and access 
complementary assets, because the access of all assets necessary for the production of a 
certain good without partners is hard to accomplish (Chung et al., 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 
1994). As suggested by the resource based view, the decision to ally can be based on the 
objective to be competitive in a particular market (Hitt et al., 1999). Especially if the need-
ed factors are not available through arms-lengths transactions and require a long time to 
build up, alliances can be very effective to obtain access to these assets. In general, this 
kind of alliance is more likely to be set up if both companies have assets to offer that the 
other company needs (Ahuja, 2000). In addition, companies can prefer alliances, “because 
the investment or long term commitment is less than that required in acquisitions” (Barney 
et al., 2001, p. 627). 
Distribute risks and share costs 
New product development or other ventures of a company into unknown terrains are often 
associated with immense risks of failure. Although a success would be very rewarding, 
companies opt to share the risks and costs with partners (Fuller & Porter, 1986; Gopala-
krishnan et al., 2008). On the one hand, and in many such cases, the responsibilities within 
the alliance are very clearly separated. One company possesses the technology and skills 
necessary to develop the product, while the other has the capital and/ or resources to fund 
the project (Mariti & Smiley, 1983). On the other hand, if the companies have homogenous 
resources and skill sets, cost sharing (as a form of financial risk sharing) may be the domi-
nant objective, especially in large projects (Sakakibara, 1997). 
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Market consolidation 
Improve legitimacy and reputation  
By joining an alliance, companies accept that they are being associated with the other 
company. When entering a new market environment, this can be helpful, because “allianc-
es convey endorsements” (Stuart, 2000, p. 808). An alliance membership can help to create 
awareness for the brand and to build public confidence in it, e.g. for potential customers, 
suppliers, and employees (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The affiliation through an 
alliance with a prominent company or, in the case of a multilateral alliance, with a promi-
nent alliance network, is also a signal of quality, because the partner risks its reputation for 
the alliance partner(s) (Ozmel et al., 2013). This becomes especially important for start-
ups, which may have a superior product, but struggle to communicate their true qualities. 
According to Baum et al. (2000, pp. 269-270), “a new firm’s alliance [can] provide a sig-
nificant buffer against the hazards typically faced by start-ups”. Furthermore, a partners’ 
good service quality is likely to spillover to the other partner(s), leading to an increase of 
the chance of reuse of the services of anyone of the partners (Bourdeau et al., 2007). A 
self-enforcing effect of allying can also be observed: companies that cooperate in the form 
of strategic alliances are more likely to use this form of cooperation when the transaction 
that is to be conducted has a high uncertainty and the other partner has a similar status 
(Chung et al., 2000). 
Influence competitive landscape  
Due to the combination of the partners’ strengths, strategic alliances can have a significant 
impact on the competition in an industry (Fuller & Porter, 1986). First, joining an alliance 
can have a positive impact on the market power. This is because, in a vertical alliance, the 
partner can also be the customer for the product, while in a horizontal alliance, “distribu-
tion channels and the buying power of the partners can be combined” (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996, p. 139). The relational capital on the network level of a strategic alli-
ance can, similar to the reputation and legitimacy motive, lead to further collaboration op-
tions and therefore also have a significant impact on the competitive landscape of an indus-
try. In addition, if alliance partners promote their technologies, the critical mass needed for 
a product is more likely to be reached in a shorter amount of time, thereby significantly 
impacting other companies in the industry (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). 
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Ensure opportunity to acquire target  
Alliances in the form of minority investments or joint ventures can also be used as a means 
to “ensure an opportunity to acquire a target firm or venture” (Folta, 1998, p. 1023). By not 
acquiring the target firm right away, the company is well positioned to profit from innova-
tion activity and products without the complicated process of post-merger integration and 
furthermore limiting the exposure to operational risks of the target firm (Folta, 1998). 
Business expansion 
Enter new markets 
From the previously mentioned motives, it is clear that alliances can be a good way to con-
duct complex R&D projects together and influence the industry’s market environment. 
However, as companies with heterogeneous resources ally, they can also opt to evaluate 
and pursue new market/ industry opportunities (Mitchell et al., 2002; Reuer & Tong, 
2010). Collaboration in this case can not only help start-ups to achieve better initial prod-
uct sales, but also established players from other markets entering the market. After enter-
ing a new market, the formation of new alliances can further contribute to sustaining and 
increasing growth (Singh & Mitchell, 2005). 
Expand internationally 
International expansion is a challenging task for all companies due to the different market 
needs and local requirements. Therefore, it can be beneficial to find a local ally to support 
the expansion. Three different modes of international market entry are identified in past 
research: a company can opt to license its products or set up franchising entities, it can opt 
to enter into a joint venture with local companies, or it can choose to set up a local subsidy 
(Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). The re-
source access aspect is critical for some international ventures, as they may be different in 
other national environments and cannot be easily accessed in the beginning. Alliances give 
the new market entrant more flexibility in this regard (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Mitchell et al., 2002). 
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Conform to foreign government policy 
Some countries require a local partner for expansion to that market, especially in the finan-
cial services, defense, and telecommunications industry. The motive to conform to foreign 
government is therefore one of the oldest in alliance history (Glaister & Buckley, 1996). 
Regulatory barriers of a country, i.e. the prohibition of establishing wholly owned subsi-
dies, may therefore force the company to forge an alliance with a local partner in order to 
enter the domestic market (Gomes-Casseres, 1994).  
Business operation 
Increase efficiency and realize synergies 
The alliance partners can combine and link their complementary competencies in order to 
integrate them and exploit synergies in various areas of their operation (Hagedoorn et al., 
2000; Hitt et al., 2000; Miles & Snow, 1984). Dyer and Singh (1998, p. 662) argue that 
from a transaction cost theory point of view, an alliance provides a more effective govern-
ance mechanism than market transactions and therefore lowers the transaction costs in-
volved by allowing “synergetic combinations of assets, knowledge, or capabilities”. The 
only thing superior to this cooperation is internalizing the transaction. 
Share capital 
Similar to the motive of sharing R&D costs, where one company may provide the other 
with capital to conduct research on a certain project, capital for non-new product develop-
ment related operations can also be provided as part of the alliance cooperation. This is 
especially interesting in highly capital intense industries like the aviation industry 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999). 
2.4 Downsides of strategic alliances 
The literature on downsides of strategic alliances is not as rich as the literature of the mo-
tives. However, several, distinct downsides have been identified during the literature re-
view. Table 3 on the next page gives an overview of the categories, downsides, and the 
studies that refer to them, respectively. 
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Table 3: Downsides in strategic alliance literature 
Cat. Downsides Study 
In
no
-
va
tio
n Unintended knowledge transfer 
Diminishing diversity of knowledge 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000); Hamel et al. (1989); 
Kale et al. (2000) 
C
on
so
lid
at
io
n/
  
Ex
pa
ns
io
n Partner dependence 
Partner redundancy 
Opportunistic behavior 
Negative spillover 
Baum and Oliver (1991); Bourdeau et al. 
(2007); Chung et al. (2000); Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996); Folta (1998); Glaister 
and Buckley (1996); Hagedoorn et al. (2000); 
Hamel et al. (1989); Lazzarini (2007); 
Mudambi and Tallman (2010); Nooteboom et 
al. (1997); Ozmel et al. (2013); Soh (2010); 
Stuart (2000) 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
Underperformance 
Coordination problems 
Higher than anticipated mgmt. costs 
Glaister and Buckley (1996); Gopalakrishnan 
et al. (2008); Gulati (1999); Hagedoorn et al. 
(2000); Kogut (1991); Mitchell et al. (2002); 
Reuer and Ragozzino (2006); Sakakibara 
(1997) 
 
Overall, the downsides can be clustered in the same categories as the motives. However, 
due to an overlap of the downsides and risks with regards to market consolidation and 
business expansion, these two categories have been combined. The category innovation 
includes all downsides associated with new product development and knowledge sharing. 
Market consolidation and business expansion related downsides include risks associated 
with changing market environments, partner dependence, and new (international) market 
entries. Finally, business operation includes motivations that influence the day-to-day 
business of the company, such as marketing alliances or shared services. A more detailed 
explanation of the downsides is set out below, according to the structure of the table. 
Innovation 
Unintended knowledge transfer 
Strategic alliances are very complex structures and not easy to control. In research, they are 
also described as incomplete contracts, due to the risk that property rights may not be 
clearly separated and the measurement of the contribution of each partner to the output is 
difficult. Alliance partners therefore face the risk of unintended transfer of critical 
knowledge and competencies (Baum et al., 2000; Kale et al., 2000). This leakage does not 
necessarily have to be due to the partners’ opportunistic behavior, but can also be due to 
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the fact that very important knowledge-transactions are generally “stuck four or five organ-
izational levels below where the deal was signed” (Hamel et al., 1989, p. 136). This can 
lead to the unintentional leakage of knowledge in the course of personal interaction (Baum 
et al., 2000). However, the use of appropriate governance structures and integrated conflict 
management are expected to at least partially help dispel this risk (Kale et al., 2000; Wil-
liamson, 1991). 
Diminishing diversity of knowledge over time 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) point out that alliances need to continually reevaluate their alli-
ance partners. The diversity of knowledge within the alliance network diminishes as part-
ners work more closely together and will eventually adapt certain norms and behaviors. An 
alliance, built on the diversity of knowledge and resources will, in this case, lose its major 
benefit to the members. 
Market consolidation and business expansion 
Partner dependence 
As mentioned earlier, using a partner’s marketing, distribution network, or infrastructure is 
one of the main reasons companies choose to form/ join an alliance. However, the close 
collaboration also brings the risk of partner dependence with it, which might outweigh the 
short term gain from using the partners’ resources and capabilities (Singh & Mitchell, 
2005). Partners may find themselves locked in to the cooperation because of high switch-
ing costs associated with the exit (Nooteboom et al., 1997). As the contribution of distinct 
capabilities decreases, companies risk having to reveal more and more knowledge in order 
to remain attractive to the alliance partner(s) and find themselves in a “dependency spiral” 
(Hamel et al., 1989, p. 135). 
Partner redundancy 
Both a company that operates an alliance portfolio or the members of a multilateral alli-
ance face the problem of partner similarity. A heterogeneous pool of information is critical 
for the success of an alliance. As soon as the threshold, until which similar partners con-
tribute to a firms’ or alliances’ innovation activity, is reached adding more partners to the 
alliance can be very detrimental (Luo & Deng, 2009). As Baum et al. (2000) point out, the 
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non-observance of partner diversity when adding new partners to an alliance portfolio or a 
multilateral alliance will lead to no access to additional knowledge, but at greater costs. 
Opportunistic behavior 
The downside of unintended knowledge transfer is closely related to opportunistic behav-
ior. While knowledge can be transferred unintentionally due to personal interaction, oppor-
tunistic behavior of an alliance partner is a much bigger threat and may undermine the joint 
achievement of learning goals (Gulati, 1998; Kale et al., 2000; Larsson et al., 1998). In 
order to prevent opportunistic behavior, the companies involved have to invest in monitor-
ing and penalization mechanisms (Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). Establishing a trust-based 
relationship over time, as a substitute for formal control mechanisms, can also mitigate the 
risk of opportunistic behavior (Nooteboom et al., 1997). 
Negative spillover 
Spillover effects can either be positive or negative. On the one hand, they can improve the 
legitimacy and reputation, as previously discussed. On the other hand, spillover effects can 
negatively impact customers’ perception of the service and quality provided. Service fail-
ures are equally attributed to other partners as good service, meaning that the signaling of 
quality works either way (Bourdeau et al., 2007; Ozmel et al., 2013).  
Business operation 
Underperformance 
One of the main objectives to join an alliance that was mentioned in the previous section is 
risk sharing. Essentially, this relates to the risk that the objectives of the alliance are not 
achieved (Fuller & Porter, 1986; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; Mariti & Smiley, 1983; Sa-
kakibara, 1997). The risk of underperformance includes all possible hazards and obstacles 
on the way to achieving the strategic objectives. For example, a partner may not be as ca-
pable in the area as originally anticipated, or negatively influenced by the environment or 
industry landscape in the course of the cooperation (performance risk), or may not fully 
commit to the objectives of the alliance (relational risk) (T. K. Das & Teng, 1996). 
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Coordination problems 
The more partners there are in a multilateral alliance, the harder the coordination becomes, 
which can ultimately lead to problems and a diminishing effectiveness of the alliance. Bal-
ancing internal competition with the overall goals of the alliance is a challenging task for 
the alliance management. As Gomes-Casseres (1994, p. 66) notes with respect to the avia-
tion industry: “the line between just enough and too much competition is a fine one”. 
Higher than anticipated management costs 
Appropriate governance mechanisms are critical for the success of the alliance, in order to 
for example reduce coordination problems and opportunistic behavior. However, establish-
ing and executing the complex mechanisms supporting the transfer of knowledge may be 
costlier than anticipated (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009). Due to the distinctive dynamics 
within a multilateral alliance and the more complex governance structure required, the is-
sue of higher than anticipated management costs becomes even more likely (Lavie et al., 
2007).  
2.5 Strategic alliance design options 
Alliance type 
In existing research, two categories are commonly used to differentiate the alliance types: 
equity alliances and non-equity alliances (or contractual alliances) (e.g. T. K. Das & Teng, 
1996; Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1991; Rugman, 1982; Teece, 1992; Yoshino & Rangan, 
1995).  
Equity-based alliances involve either minority equity agreements, where one or both part-
ner acquire an equity stake in the other company, or equity joint ventures, for which a new, 
jointly owned, entity is created (Dussauge & Garrette, 1999). Equity stakes in this new 
entity can be either split symmetric (50:50) or with asymmetric equity stakes of the part-
ners. Both the minority equity alliance, as well as the equity joint venture aim at a long-
term collaboration of the firms (T. K. Das & Teng, 2001; Dussauge & Garrette, 1999).  
Non-equity alliances can be formed based on a uni- or bilateral contract, without the in-
volvement of equity or the creation of a separate entity. Partners in a unilateral contract 
based alliance work separately and, according to the contracts, are focused on the pre-
defined tasks. Partners in a bilateral contract based alliance work jointly for a common 
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goal (Dussauge & Garrette, 1999). Characteristics of the latter type commonly involve 
organizational adaptions, which make an unplanned alliance termination more complicated 
than in the unilateral form (T. K. Das & Teng, 2001; Dussauge & Garrette, 1999; Yoshino 
& Rangan, 1995). However, non-equity alliances in general are much more flexible than 
equity involving alliances, as the commitment is lower. Non-equity alliances in general can 
be established much faster and involve a significantly smaller financial commitment than 
equity alliances (Gulati, 1995). However, due to their contract-based nature, they lack con-
trol as well as commitment advantages that are present in the equity alliance. Furthermore, 
they can involve problems of interest alignment, behavioral control, and distribution of 
performance outcomes (T. K. Das & Teng, 1996). 
Partner selection 
Research has found many different factors influencing alliance success. The partner selec-
tion is broadly acknowledged as one of the most important factors (Shah & Swaminathan, 
2008). A good partner fit can lead to higher efficiency, better cooperation, and ultimately 
to strategic advantages (Lambe & Spekman, 1997).  
Parkhe (1991) characterizes a good partner fit as one that features high resource comple-
mentarity, as well as cultural and operational compatibility. Following research determined 
three main categories of partner selection: partner complementarity, partner commitment, 
and partner compatibility (Kale & Singh, 2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). 
First, partner complementarity describes, in accordance with the resource based view and 
social network theory, the degree of contrasting strategic resources that partners can pro-
vide an alliance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Geringer, 1991). These resources can be either in-
tangible (e.g. patents or know-how) or tangible (e.g. financial resources or production in-
puts). Resource gaps can be closed as companies may be willing to share their resources if, 
in return, they obtain access to resources not available on the market (Ahuja, 2000; Barney 
et al., 2001; Chung et al., 2000; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; Hennart, 1991; Hitt et al., 
1999; Teng, 2007).  
Second, partner commitment describes a partner’s engagement to contribute non-trivial 
resources to a relationship and the willingness to also accept short-term losses for the sake 
of long-term advantages (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995). One critical factor in this 
regard is the absence of contrary goals (Child & Faulkner, 1998). Partner commitment is 
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particularly essential in cases in which the goals of the inter-organizational cooperation are 
congruous and in which uncertainty exists in regards to the exact work-flow and processes. 
Finally, partner compatibility defines the compatibility of corporate cultures and working 
style of each corporation (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001). However, in 
contrast to partner complementarity, this characteristic is very much partner-specific 
(Geringer, 1991). Important factors in this regard are the national culture, as well as the 
corporate culture (Altman & Baruch, 1998; Hofstede, 1984). 
Alliance governance 
Because of the specific challenges of an alliance, the partners need to define specific regu-
latory and administrative structures. These structures are defined as a bundle of formal and 
informal rules for the management, organization, and regulation of the alliance (Albers, 
2010). Governance structures of alliances are significantly more complex to analyze in 
comparison to those of single organizations. This is because of their inherent duality, the 
existence of a “single organizational arrangement and a product of sovereign organiza-
tions” at the same time (Borys & Jemison, 1989, p. 235). In addition, the alliance govern-
ance lacks the final authority to change the partners’ cooperative behavior (Dussauge & 
Garrette, 1999).  
This study employs the conceptualization by Albers (2010), as it provides a good integra-
tion of previous research in the field of alliance governance systems. According to Albers 
(2010), organizations that want to cooperate in the confines of an alliance, can be split in 
three parts for a deeper analysis. The first part is the strategic apex – the companies’ man-
agement – which is responsible for formulating the strategy, as well as the administration, 
guidance, and termination of an alliance. The second part is the firm organization – the 
middle management – which is either exclusively dedicated to the alliance or working both 
in the firm and the alliance and manages the day-to-day operations to implement the man-
agement’s vision. The third part is the operating core, which executes the value generating 
processes. The right form of alliance governance depends on the characteristics of these 
three parts and additional contingency factors, such as the member firm and alliance size, 
external environment, power relation, aim and scope, uncertainty and trust, member firm 
alliance experience, as well as member firm culture. The typical configurations of alliance 
governance systems differ in their structure and dynamic mechanisms. The structural di-
mensions reflect the degree of centralization, specialization, and formalization. The alli-
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ances’ centralization is further split into vertical and horizontal centralization, in order to 
reflect the area of decision making. In addition, the structure can be specialized and have 
explicit alliance functions. Moreover, the degree of formalization reflects the extent to 
which pre-defined plans and processes exist.  
Alliance portfolios and multilateral alliances 
The previous sections focused on dyadic alliances, as does most of the existing literature 
on strategic alliances. However, in praxis, companies are often part of multiple alliances, 
either in the form of an alliance portfolio or as participants in a multilateral alliance. As 
previously mentioned, alliance portfolios are defined as a “set of discrete bilateral alliances 
entered into by a firm” (Doz & Hamel, 1998, p. 222). A focal firm maintains a portfolio of 
different alliances with different goals and can enter/ terminate each of these alliances sep-
arately. The term “multilateral alliance” describes formalized arrangements between more 
than two partners for a common goal and with a potentially broader scope (Doz & Hamel, 
1998; Lazzarini, 2008). 
Generally speaking, multiple alliances have similar benefits and management challenges as 
a bilateral alliance, but some distinct differences exist. The greater number of partners of-
fers access to more diverse information and network level learning activities as the firm’s 
knowledge is made widely available for other firms (Baum et al., 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000). This enables more unique combinations of the knowledge and enhances innovation. 
Furthermore, multiple alliances offer new collaboration opportunities in terms of contact to 
other companies within the network. As such, a firm within a multiple alliance profits from 
the relational capital, which may lead to new projects or innovations (Khanna et al., 1998). 
Alliances, established with the objective to realize synergies and increase efficiencies, also 
profit from multiple partners, as the number of companies sharing the costs of shared ser-
vices increases and a higher market power can be exercised to achieve larger economies of 
scale and scope (Soh, 2010). 
However, firms have to balance their alliance activity as diminishing returns from exces-
sive alliance activity exist. Up until a certain threshold regarding the number of partners, 
multiple alliances may well benefit the company, but exceeding that number may lead to 
increased complexity and dysfunctional behavior (Ding, Eliashberg, & Stremersch, 2013; 
Gulati, 1995). Management issues of multiple alliances can be distinguished in an external 
(portfolio coordination) and internal (organizational learning and synergies) perspective 
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(Doz & Hamel, 1998). The portfolio coordination is characterized by an increased com-
plexity due to a greater variety of diverse partners. This means that issues already stated for 
dyadic alliances become even more critical. Multiple partners make it harder to monitor 
and control for opportunism and free riding, as well as to find common ground considering 
the different individual views (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Furthermore, a higher coordina-
tion effort is necessary to deal with the increased complexity of alliance governance and 
ambiguity of relations (Doz & Hamel, 1998). Balancing cooperation and competition can 
be a highly challenging task for an alliance as a whole. Though more diverse knowledge is 
potentially available in multi-partner alliances, the realization of organizational learning 
and synergies yields many challenges. The partner selection also becomes more problemat-
ic, as complementarity needs to be ensured, but the commitment and compatibility still 
need to be high. As the alliance evolves, companies may become more and more alike, as 
they exchange knowledge and deepen their cooperation. This may cause the “diversity of 
knowledge” to diminish over time, which poses an existential threat to the alliance (Dyer 
& Nobeoka, 2000, p. 365). 
3 Evolution, business models and cooperation in the aviation industry 
3.1 Aviation industry evolution 
Aviation has come a long way from the Wright brothers’ first flight of a heavier-than-air, 
powered aircraft in 1903 and the first commercial flight in 1914, which covered 34km in a 
mere 23 minutes (IATA, 2014). Today, the worlds’ longest, non-stop route connects Dubai 
(United Arab Emirates) and Auckland (New Zealand), and covers about 14,200km in 17 
hours and 15 minutes (BBC, 2016). The success story of the industry started in 1929, when 
the Warsaw Convention was signed by 152 parties. It was the first international agreement 
on rules regarding international air carriage, and mandated the issuing of passenger tickets 
and baggage checks, as well as setting rules for legal jurisdiction and the airline’s liability 
for passengers and cargo (IATA, 2014; ICAO, 1929). The first major players emerged 
within ten years after the convention was signed. In combination with new innovations and 
technical progress, such as the milestone release of the Douglas DC-3 in 1936, passenger 
air travel became profitable and thus started “the modern era of passenger air services“ 
(IATA, 2014). 
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The industry was, for the longest time, highly regulated. The U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act in 
1938 established the Civil Aeronautics Board, which was responsible for setting up the 
route network and ticket prices. This act favored established players and posed a challenge 
for new market entrants. Since fares were regulated by the government, airlines had to dif-
ferentiate themselves from their competitors by offering high quality services. American 
Airlines was the first airline ever to open an airport lounge at LaGuardia Airport, New 
York in 1939. This service offering later became a central part of alliance bonus systems, 
evaluated in more detail later in this chapter. While the industry grew, the governments of 
52 countries agreed to implement common “rules and regulations for aircraft, airspace and 
safety” (IATA, 2014) during the Chicago Convention in 1944, which is still the legal foun-
dation for today’s commercial aviation and the origin of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (IATA, 2014; ICAO, 2006). 
The Boeing 747, the world’s first wide-body aircraft, entered service in 1970 on Pan 
American Airlines’ route from New York to London. It was the next leap towards air travel 
for a broader audience. Passenger capacity increased significantly, which allowed the re-
duction of ticket prices, making air travel more affordable for travelers around the world. 
The reduction of ticket prices was stimulated once more in 1971, when Southwest Airlines 
became the world’s first low cost carrier and therefore changed the industry landscape for-
ever (IATA, 2014). 
After that, in 1972, the first neutral paper ticket was issued, meaning that any travel agent 
around the world was able to book flights on almost any airline in the world, which further 
supported the expansion of the business. Furthermore, following the growth of information 
technology, the Billing and Settlement Plan was established at the same time. The Billing 
and Settlement Plan is the foundation for inter-airline travelling, as it ensures that airlines 
receive their share of the ticket price promptly and as accurately as possible. By 2012, 88 
Billing and Settlement Plans served 350 airlines in 177 countries and territories, processing 
$249 billion (IATA, 2014). This unique, never seen before, combination enabled the coop-
eration of different airlines from around the globe and is at the very root of the creation of 
airline alliances. A few years later, in the mid-1970s, British Airlines started to offer ex-
ceptionally inexpensive transatlantic flights, which caused American airlines to have a 
strong disadvantage as they were still heavily regulated. After being urged by the Ameri-
can carriers, the U.S. Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 – kick starting 
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an era of free market competition, phasing out the government’s control of fares and 
routes. This made the entrance of new airlines viable again, exposing U.S. carriers to mar-
ket forces and ultimately fostered the global liberalization of the industry (IATA, 2014). 
After the deregulation of the industry and the entrance of new carriers in the market, fare 
prices decreased and passenger numbers increased significantly. The new pace of the in-
dustry forced major American players, such as Pan American Airlines and TWA, who 
dominated the previous centuries, to cease their operations in the early 1990s, following 
the economic downturn after the Gulf War. 
Despite the economic downturn, customer loyalty and service offerings remained very im-
portant factors in the industry. Robert Cradell, President and Chairman of American Air-
lines, established the first ever successful frequent flyer program AAdvantage in 1981, 
which now has 72 million members and still remains among the largest frequent flyer pro-
grams worldwide (Ernst & Young, 2014; IATA, 2014). Airlines also continued to explore 
collaboration opportunities leading to the formation of the Wings Alliance of KLM and 
Northwest Airlines in 1989. Though it remained a bilateral alliance throughout its exist-
ence, it proved the advantages of consolidation for both the airlines and the consumers. 
The granting of Anti-Trust Immunity by the Department of Transportation in 1993 paved 
the way not only for this collaboration, but for all alliances to come (IATA, 2014; 
Schlangen, 2000). 
The 1990s was a very influential decade for the aviation industry: The era of open skies 
began in 1992, when the first open skies agreement was signed between the United States 
and the Netherlands. Open skies agreements aim at liberalizing the rules and regulations of 
the international airline industry, by i.e. “giving each country unrestricted landing rights in 
each other’s territory” (IATA, 2014) in order to create a free market environment. The in-
dustry was heavily influenced in the following years by the development of more and more 
agreements, eventually leading to the multilateral EU-US Air Transport Agreement signed 
in 2007 (European Commission, 2015). Other open skies agreements include the U.S. and 
China, India, as well as the United Arab Emirates and the EU and Australia and New Zea-
land. 
In 1997, the first multilateral airline alliance, the Star Alliance, was founded by five air-
lines from three continents and expanded in the years to follow. Two other (multilateral) 
global airline alliances were founded shortly thereafter in 1999: Oneworld and SkyTeam, 
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bringing a great variety of benefits to customers and creating economies of scale as well as 
strategic advantages for the airlines (IATA, 2014; oneworld, 2015; SkyTeam, 2014a; Star 
Alliance, 2016a). Today, the three major alliances have a total market share of 63.8% and 
consist of 27 members (Star Alliance), 19 members (SkyTeam) and 15 members (one-
world) (see Appendix A: Global airline alliance overview). 
3.2 Carrier differentiation 
Empirical magazines and theoretical studies differentiate between three different carrier 
groups in passenger aviation: network carriers, gulf carriers, and low-cost carriers (e.g. 
Delfmann, Baum, Auerbach, & Albers, 2005; Dresner et al., 2015; Graf, 2005; O’Connell, 
2011; Vespermann et al., 2008). Due to their comparable business model and operation, 
the focus of this thesis is on network and gulf-carriers, as low-cost carriers are unlikely to 
enter any of the global airline alliances due to their different business model and service 
offerings. 
In order to distinguish the carrier groups, it is important to understand the way aviation 
networks are set up. In a hub and spoke system, which is widely employed by network 
carriers, traffic that comes from one city (spoke) is distributed through a central hub, to the 
final destination (spoke), except if one passenger’s departure city or destination is the hub 
itself. This enables carriers, to offer flights from each spoke within its network to another 
spoke, with one layover at the hub. The other system that is commonly used, is the point to 
point system, which provides direct traffic from one city to another. The reason, why the 
hub and spoke system is so popular, is that it provides a large number of possible connec-
tions, even with a relatively low number of airports. 
Network carriers4 operate their flights based on a hub and spoke system and have a dense 
route network with one or more hubs. Coordinated feeder5 and connecting flights to/ from 
these hubs offer as many connections as possible. The operating reach of network carriers 
is global. Therefore, network carriers fly to domestic, inter- and intra-continental destina-
                                                
4 A variety of names are used in the literature to describe this type of airline. Other names used most com-
monly include: “international passage airlines“, “major airlines“, “full-services carrier“, “full service network 
carrier”. 
5 Feeder flights bring-in travelers from destinations not served by the airline itself to hubs, where they can 
continue their journey. 
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tions. However, no airline has yet built a network that spans the whole globe, which high-
lights the importance of strategic alliances among network carriers in order to expand their 
scope. Contrary to low-cost carriers that have very homogenous fleets (with only one or 
two types), the aircraft fleet of a network carrier is very heterogeneous, with turboprops 
and small aircrafts for domestic connections as well as wide body aircrafts and jumbo jets 
for international connections. Also, there is a large variety of available upgrades and ser-
vice offerings provided by these airlines. The classes available to the customer vary from 
Economy, Premium Economy, Business, and First Class, each offering more space and/ or 
more sophisticated information and entertainment solutions, as well as extra luggage and 
lounge access, etc. (Groß, 2011; Maurer, 2007; Reichmuth et al., 2008). 
Gulf carriers form a subgroup of network carriers, as they also base their services on a hub 
and spoke system. The term “gulf carrier” refers to airlines based in the gulf region and is 
most commonly associated with the three major carriers based in the gulf region: Emirates 
(Dubai, United Arab Emirates), Etihad Airways (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates), and 
Qatar Airways (Doha, Qatar) (Dresner et al., 2015; Squalli, 2014). For an overview of gulf 
carrier key facts, see Appendix E: Gulf carrier overview. One of the main reasons for the 
gulf carriers’ development is the states’, airlines’, and airports’ vision to develop air 
transport as a major income stream alternative to oil and gas exports. The gulf carriers have 
been growing at a remarkable pace in recent years. Individually, they already match or 
exceed the size of major, established players in the European and American aviation mar-
ket. 
Besides their economic success, the gulf carriers have been in the spotlight of criticism, 
mainly from established network carriers, for receiving high subsidies from their respective 
governments and therefore having an unfair competitive advantage. Additional areas of 
criticisms include the absence of taxes (Air passenger taxes, income taxes for both the 
company and employees, VAT on domestic flights), environmental protection (carbon off-
setting, noise control, ban on night flights), labor unions, as well as low airport and service 
fees (Lufthansa, 2014; Partnership for Open & Fair Skies, 2016). Besides these characteris-
tics, gulf carriers have a very distinct competitive advantage that separates them from other 
carriers: their location in the gulf area, which is an essential part of their transfer hub strat-
egy for long haul services, allows them to reach most of the worlds’ major cities within 
eight hours of flight time. The gulf carriers’ success essentially depends on the connecting 
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traffic from long haul flights, as the local market in the Middle East is limited due to a 
small population (Clayton & Hilz, 2015). 
Airlines in general, but specifically gulf carriers, expand their networks by utilizing the 
freedom rights, enacted during the Chicago Convention. The information on the freedom 
rights provided in this study are based on the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO, 2004). The fifth freedom right was originally initiated to make long haul flights 
viable. Airlines are allowed to include one or more layovers along the way to their final 
destination to pick up more passengers. The sixth freedom right is based on the hub and 
spoke system, which enables airlines operating with this model to offer routes between two 
spokes (cities) in different countries, while connecting through the airline’s hub. The sixth 
freedom right provides the opportunity to not rely on the two governments to form bilateral 
agreements (as it would be necessary for a direct flight between the two city pairs), but 
rather on bilateral agreements between the hub and the spoke, only.  
 
Figure 1: Excerpt from "The Nine Freedoms of the Air" (ICAO, 2004, pp. 4.1-9) 
Finally, the seventh freedom right allows airlines to establish domestic routes that do not 
need to connect or extend international flights from the airline’s home country. Emirates 
would, for example, therefore be able to offer flights from Dubai to Melbourne via Perth, 
but could offer the flight from Perth to Melbourne individually. All of the freedom rights 
are, however, subject to negotiations with the countries involved, which can take a signifi-
cant amount of time before being successful (Doganis, 2009; ICAO, 2004). Figure 1 illus-
trates the fifth to seventh freedom rights for clarification purposes. 
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3.3 Airline industry cooperative structure 
The overview of the industry evolution earlier in this study showed that the market deregu-
lation and liberalization did not only enable the quick international expansion of airline 
networks, but also was the beginning of the era of airline alliances. After years of forming 
and terminating new alliances, the current market structure with three global airline alli-
ances competing against a number of network carriers, various low-cost carriers, and two 
of the gulf carriers has been relatively stable. The annual “Alliances Survey” by Airline 
Business6 magazine points out that the cooperation objectives of global airline alliances 
include joint ventures in route network development and flight operation, joint catering, 
ground handling and aircraft maintenance, shared sales, marketing, purchasing and insur-
ance operations, codesharing, and frequent flyer programs. One of the main objectives of 
the global airline alliances is the development of a superior route network, which is 
achieved through the exploitation of structural holes. In practice, this means that the mem-
bers of the alliance aim to increase the frequency of flights, establish new routes through 
connecting flights with alliance partners, and reduce the overall travel time with better 
connections (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). This indicates that airlines need to keep 
screening for new business opportunities and partners in order to stay ahead of the compe-
tition. Furthermore, Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006) suggest that a strategic reposition-
ing is advisable for companies that find themselves in a situation with a low uniqueness of 
resources (e.g. two airlines with a similar route network in one alliance). That said, it is 
obvious that the competition takes place on two levels: 
First, externally, the multilateral alliances themselves compete against each other and 
against unallied airlines. The competition among networks is based on the main objective 
of the alliances, providing the best worldwide network and benefitting from the network 
effects, as well as from joint airport facilities and a common branding. In addition, being a 
member of any of the global airline alliances does not prohibit airlines from forming part-
nerships outside of the alliance. For example, oneworld member Qantas operates a joint 
venture with Emirates on flights between Australia and Europe via Dubai. Moreover, unal-
lied airlines also impose pressure on the networks. 
                                                
6 The Airline Business magazine is published monthly and well known for its interviews with industry lead-
ers and in-depth analysis. Beside the top 100 airlines and airports surveys, traditionally the September issue 
features the annual alliance survey referenced in this chapter. 
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Second, internally, the companies within an alliance compete against each other. The com-
petition within networks is commonly referred to as coopetition (Mohr & Spekman, 1994), 
as both cooperation and competition motives exist side-by-side. Companies may remain 
competitors although they cooperate on many aspects of the customers’ travel experience. 
Alliances should constantly search for structural holes and for partners that can fill them, 
followed by the termination of relationships with partners that become unprofitable. There-
fore, participating in an alliance network can be described as a constant fight for a mutually 
beneficial competitive position and resources (both internal and external). Gudmundsson 
and Lechner (2006) argue that due to this competitive behavior, alliances cannot be stable 
with partner exits and new entrants being necessary in order to stay competitive. 
Interestingly, the model of alliance web evolution by Doz and Hamel (1998, p. 246), antic-
ipated the current development in the aviation industry, even though the original predic-
tions were based on observations from the automotive and microelectronics industry. The 
model suggests that alliances evolve from independent competitors to multilateral allianc-
es, when the need for joined work is determined. From there, the multilateral alliances 
evolve to competitive coalitions, when the coopetition within the alliance becomes more 
stable and the alliances consolidate. Etihad has built its alliance and equity ownerships 
regardless of the alliance membership status and its partners deepen their cooperation 
across alliance borders. For example, Air Berlin is working together with Air France 
(SkyTeam), British Airways (oneworld), Etihad (through Etihad’s equity partners) and 
Qatar Airways (oneworld) all at once.  
3.4 Global airline alliances 
The Star Alliance’s 28 members have an overall market share of 24% and fly to 1,213 des-
tinations worldwide, serving 192 countries (see Appendix B: Star Alliance member air-
lines). As pointed out earlier in this study, the Star Alliance, founded by Air Canada, 
Lufthansa, SAS, Thai Airways, and United Airlines in 1997, was the first major airline 
alliance. The goal was to “take passengers to every major city on earth” by providing a 
vast and efficient network (Tagliabue, 1997).  
SkyTeam’s 20 member airlines have an overall market share of 20.8% and fly to 1,037 
destinations worldwide, serving 177 countries (see Appendix C: SkyTeam member air-
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lines). Its portfolio was significantly diversified recently by the addition of carriers such as 
China Airlines, Garuda Indonesia, Kenya Airways, and Saudi Airlines.  
Oneworld’s 15 member airlines have an overall market share of 19.0% and fly to 954 des-
tinations worldwide, serving 154 countries – significantly fewer than the two competitors 
(see Appendix D: oneworld member airlines). These destinations are, however, targeted 
towards, and highly relevant for, business travelers. Oneworld’s approach to alliance gov-
ernance is more open compared to its competitors, with the spirit of the alliance being “a 
little bit less dependent between each other than other alliances” (Iatrou & Oretti, 2016; 
Pilling, 2005). However, oneworld still has a separate entity for governing the alliance: 
The oneworld Management Company, set up in Vancouver (Canada) in 2000, is now lo-
cated in New York. Function heads from the commercial, membership, customer experi-
ence, finance, IT, and corporate communications departments report to CEO Bruce Ashby, 
while he himself reports to the governing board, consisting of the CEOs of oneworld’s 
member airlines. The alliances’ activities are furthermore managed by 25 full-time em-
ployees of the oneworld management company. Overall, this setup constitutes a high hori-
zontal centralization. Vertically, each of the airlines operates alone, but when necessary 
work together with the oneworld management company in working groups “drawn from 
executives across all member airlines”. Standardization is also an important factor for 
oneworld. According to a press release from Dell (2012), oneworld has implemented a new 
information technology infrastructure with a hub based on Dell’s “Boomi AtomSphere” 
cloud integration. This new system aims at standardizing the IT environment of all member 
airlines and will, according to Dell (2012), “substantially reduce the complexity, cost and 
time involved” in the operations. 
Despite being less integrated as an alliance, many of oneworld’s members decided to form 
joint ventures. Such an example is American Airlines, British Airways, and Iberia, which 
launched joined services across the Atlantic in 2010 (before the merger of British Airways 
and Iberia), with Finnair eventually joining them three years later (oneworld, 2016).  
4 Case study of the gulf carrier’s multi-partner alliance strategy 
The previous sections not only provided an explanation of the motivations and downsides 
of joining alliances, but also provided a broad foundation for the further analysis of alli-
ances, such as types of alliances, important factors for partner selection, and governance 
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options. The following paragraphs summarize and synthesize the findings regarding the 
motivations and downsides from the structured literature analysis. 
4.1 Methodology 
In line with the suggestion of Eisenhardt (1989), the multiple case study approach will be 
used in order to evaluate the gulf carriers’ reasons behind their alliance affiliation. As she 
notes, this type of research is especially useful when developing theoretical constructs, 
which in this study reflect the propositions that are to be developed in the discussion. Sev-
eral sources are potentially available to obtain information for the cases. According to Yin 
(2009, p. 101), these are “documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation, and physical artifacts”. Combining different materials is the 
unique strength of the case study. Because of the research objective’s qualitative nature to 
understand the management’s decision not to join a global airline alliance, this study em-
ploys only qualitative data for the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1981). As gulf carriers and 
airline alliances in general are a much discussed topic in the industry, even though no ac-
cess to primary data such as personal interviews could be obtained, very valuable infor-
mation from top management of the airlines is publicly available.  
For the analysis, the information from the literature review is bundled in a conceptual 
framework, which is then used as the foundation and guiding structure of the case analysis 
and further discussion. Theoretical insights from the literature review on individual carriers 
are used to hypothesize on the reasons behind carrier-specific decisions. In this, infor-
mation is drawn from multiple sources of evidence in order to maximize the benefit of the 
case study (Yin, 2009). Company histories and other critical information such as the cost 
structure and involvement of the states are reflected against the extant theory on allying. 
Empirical data such as interview transcripts, reports from leading industry magazines, 
newspaper articles, as well as press releases and annual reports are included to gain reas-
surance to the interpretations through comparison and in order to develop deeper case-
specific understanding of management decisions. The carrier-specific narratives are devel-
oped from theoretical insights, in the first line, as reflected against company information 
and empirical data to back up the findings. An overview of all empirical data that has been 
collected for the case study is shown in Appendix F: Case study material overview. The 
data collection took place during March to September 2016. The narratives are finally 
summarized in the tables 4 and 5. 
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4.2 Derivation of the analysis framework 
In order to take a conceptual approach to answering the question of why the gulf carriers 
choose not to join any of the global airline alliances, it is necessary to evaluate the motiva-
tions and downsides in the carrier’s specific context. As aforementioned, the decision pro-
cess can be split into two separate steps: First, the general decision to form an alliance 
needs to be made based on the thorough evaluation of benefits and downsides that come 
with the alliance (Gulati, 1998). Therefore, this decision point marks the first step in the 
analysis framework. On the one hand, if the downsides outweigh the motivations, the deci-
sion should be to stay autonomous. On the other hand, if the motivations outweigh the 
downsides, the decision should be to form or join an alliance. However, this simplified 
evaluation dismisses one important factor: the management and its decision making. 
Therefore, this rational view needs to be expanded to include management specific views 
regarding the company’s strategy, as the management team ultimately determines if the 
alliance is formed or not. Second, in case the decision is made to form or join an alliance 
(if the motivations to form an alliance outweigh the downsides), the management needs to 
consider the different alliance design options presented earlier in the literature review. The 
fundamental decision to form a unilateral alliance or to form/ join a multilateral alliance 
again brings its own specific advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. 
This is also true for the institutionalization as a contract or equity based alliance and the 
selection of partners with low, medium, or high complementarity, compatibility, and com-
mitment. In addition, the setup of the alliance governance with low, medium, or high for-
malization, specialization, and centralization also impacts the cooperation. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework of the alliance and governance decisions 
The framework in figure 2 summarizes these thoughts, starting with the evaluation of mo-
tivations and downsides under consideration of management specific views and then fol-
lowing the decision process further. With this framework as a theoretical basis, the analysis 
of the individual carrier is conducted in the following sub-chapters. 
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4.3 Individual carrier analysis 
In the following paragraphs, the case study of each of the carriers will be narrated and the 
respective case will be analyzed based on the background information previously presented 
and the framework shown in figure 2. 
Emirates 
Ever since its foundation in 1985, Emirates has profited from its close ties to Dubai’s royal 
family. Its chairman, Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum is the uncle of the Emir of Dubai, 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. The company is wholly owned by the Government 
of Dubai, which provided with the initial start-up investment. After launching the first 
flights from Dubai to Karachi, the company expanded quickly adding Colombo, Dhaka, 
Amman, and Cairo as new destinations to its route network. Following further investments, 
the company continued to grow, acquiring new aircrafts and adding new destinations in 
Europe and the Far East. In 1995, after ten years of operation, Emirates was already servic-
ing 30 different countries. The following years were the starting point of a new era for 
Emirates when new aircrafts, such as the Boeing 777 and the Airbus A340 and 380, came 
into service. They made it possible for Emirates to provide non-stop services to America 
and Australia, while subsequently growing Dubai as its main hub, bypassing the traditional 
hubs in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, and Paris (Emirates, 2016b, 2016c).  
The Emirates business model is based partly on the geographical location of its hub in Du-
bai and in flight operation cost advantages due to a modern fleet with wide-body jets, and 
close to cost-optimal flight distances, as well as a lean workforce and flat organizational 
structure (CAPA, 2014). Furthermore, Emirates connects primary and secondary airports 
via its Dubai hub and therefore offers much shorter travel times due to a lower number of 
transfers required (Emirates, 2015a; Grimme, 2012). Throughout its operation, Emirates 
has been extremely selective when it comes to inter-organizational cooperation. In 2007, 
while the global airline alliances thrived, Emirates abandoned its links with Cyprus Air-
ways, US Airways, Delta Airways, and British Airways originally formed in the early 
1990s. It currently operates 16 codeshares and is part of a joint venture with Qantas on 
flights between Australia and Europe via Dubai (Dunn, 2015). 
In the aviation specific context, the exchange of complementary assets pertains to expand-
ing the network of an airline through cooperation with another airline, thereby accessing its 
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network. The combined number of destinations and routes achieved by this cooperation 
offers the chance to attract new customers. However, Emirates follows an organic growth 
strategy (Emirates, 2015b). Instead of using an alliance to expand internationally, Emir-
ates’ international expansion strategy is based on two pillars: First, they aggressively lob-
by for fifth freedom rights on long-haul routes in order to establish new services. This is a 
time consuming process, but if successful Emirates can operate the route without being 
dependent on an alliance. Second, Emirates also exploits other freedom rights, and the 
rights it gained in the early phases of their aviation history. When their planes were not 
able to go from Dubai to Australia (e.g. Auckland, Brisbane, Melbourne, or Sydney) with-
out a layover, they secured Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok as layover destinations 
and simply maintained these routes in addition to the direct routes that became possible 
through advances in aircraft technology. This opened up international expansion opportu-
nities between Dubai, Australia and New Zealand, as well as for example in Southeast 
Asia.  
Airlines in general face protectionist barriers when they try to enter new countries. As de-
scribed earlier in this study, open skies agreements are used to regulate air traffic between 
two countries (IATA, 2014). If no access to a country can be achieved through fifth, sixth 
or seventh freedom rights, cooperation can be the vehicle of choice in order to conform to 
foreign government policy. For Emirates, this can be observed in its partnership with 
Qantas, which provides access to the Australian market as well as to Qantas’ flights to Eu-
rope (Rapoza, 2014). 
Although the aviation industry is of rather capital than knowledge intensive nature, sharing 
knowledge and capabilities through alliances can positively influence the airline’s opera-
tional efficiency. However, as aforementioned, Emirates has a very low cost structure due 
to several reasons: First, it has lower fuel costs than most of the network carriers, based on 
the young age of its fleet of aircrafts, which averages at 74 months, compared to a 140 
months’ industry average (Emirates, 2016a). The region’s proximity to oil production, 
however, does not give Emirates a significant cost advantage (Emirates, 2012; Lohade, 
2015). Second, labor costs are lower in the Emirates than in Europe or the United States of 
America, because of the lack of trade unions and the under developed markets. In addition, 
salaries are not taxed in the Emirates and its geographical location gives it access to the 
cheap labor markets of neighboring countries, such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (Al-
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Kibsi, Benkert, & Schubert, 2007; Emirates, 2012). Finally, Emirates has a significant 
competitive advantage based on the low airport charges in its hub in Dubai (Parker & Kerr, 
2013). Therefore, Emirates has less need to share its knowledge and capabilities, distribute 
risks and share costs, or to increase efficiency and realize synergies - benefits normally 
thought to be inherent within an alliance - compared to other established players that lack 
this foundation. Although it could create synergies from sharing lounges and airport facili-
ties with other airlines, it would also risk the underperformance of a partner, a dilution of 
its brand and loss of control over every aspect of the customer experience that it currently 
maintains, namely risk a negative spillover. In addition, Emirates is heavily state funded 
and has almost unlimited resources as well as the support of the ruling family. Therefore, 
the sharing of capital is much less of an applicable motive to Emirates than it is to other 
established players. 
As a world-renowned airline with a solid track record, there is no reason for Emirates to 
join any airline alliance to improve its legitimacy and reputation. Rather, as shortly men-
tioned above, joining an alliance would inherent the risk that another airline does not pro-
vide the outstanding service Emirates’ customers expect, causing a negative spillover ef-
fect and pose as more of a threat to Emirates’ reputation. 
Even without joining one of the global airline alliances, the gulf carriers have had a signifi-
cant influence on the aviation industries’ competitive landscape in recent years. Emirates is 
able to exert pressure on other airlines through its low ticket fares and high quality of ser-
vice. Just by regular operation, Emirates has had a noticeable impact on the competitive 
landscape, which makes cooperating for the sake of influencing the competitive landscape 
a less applicable motive. 
The motive to ensure the opportunity to acquire target is also not applicable in the case of 
Emirates. First, acquisitions are contrary to its strategy of organic growth. Second, the ac-
quisition of airlines is at least partially regulated by the local governments, which makes it 
for example impossible to acquire a European airline, because it is not possible to own 
more than a 49% stake in European airlines. 
Emirates’ focus is very much on its passenger business and has lately expanded to cargo as 
well. However, cargo remains much smaller, which makes the motive to enter new mar-
kets, especially outside the aviation industry, not applicable.  
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Emirates voices the concern that joining a global airline alliance would be a threat to its 
flexibility. Emirates’ chairman Al Maktoum clearly states that “if [Emirates] went with the 
alliances I don’t think you would see Emirates at the size it is today” (Cronin & El Gazzar, 
2015). Emirates is cautious to become too dependent on a partner, i.e. rely on a partner’s 
approval to offer new routes and destinations (Heasley, 2010). In addition, another prob-
lem Emirates sees in alliances is the redundancy of partners. Airlines in conventional alli-
ances would also operate on many of Emirates’ routes, causing higher partner redundancy 
and therefore making it unattractive for Emirates to join one of their partnerships.  
Based on the available information, no references regarding the risks of opportunistic be-
havior, unintended knowledge transfer, diminishing diversity of knowledge, coordination 
problems and higher than anticipated management costs were found. 
Etihad Airways 
In 2003, Etihad Airways was established by Royal Decree issued by Sheikh Khalifa bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan and is, as a flag carrier, still state owned. In 2004 and 2005, the first in-
ternational flights were introduced to Geneva, Brussels, and Toronto. Just three years after 
being established, Etihad was already flying to 30 destinations with further expansions in 
the pipeline. It was also the first of the middle-eastern carriers to win the “World’s Leading 
Airline” award in 2009, continuing to win it for five consecutive years (Etihad Airways, 
2016c). Due to the bundled power within the royal family, Etihad Airways benefits from 
very flat hierarchies and quick decision processes. Its modern fleet and geographical loca-
tion give it similar advantages as Emirates. It is the smallest of the three gulf carriers (by 
available seat kilometers) and flies to 117 destinations in 68 countries, which is significant-
ly less than Emirates (151 destinations, 80 countries) and Qatar Airways (150 destinations, 
75 countries) (see Appendix E: Gulf carrier overview), but also communicates no interest 
in joining any of the global airline alliances. However, contrary to Emirates’ organic 
growth strategy, Etihad Airways follows its own equity alliance strategy and over the last 
years has built wide-ranging partnerships and acquired stakes in Air Serbia, (49%), Air 
Seychelles (40%), Air Berlin (29%), Jet Airways (24%), Virgin Australia (24%) and Alita-
lia (49%). It also acquired a 33.3% stake in the Swiss-based carrier, Darwin Airline, in 
2013, which was then rebranded to Etihad Regional (33%). A small, regional, carrier gives 
Etihad and its equity partners the chance to access tertiary cities and use these passengers 
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to feed its long haul routes and therefore put even more pressure on carriers such as the 
Lufthansa Group that currently serve these cities (CAPA, 2013).  
In 2014, Etihad Airways founded its own airline alliance, Etihad Airways Partners. It con-
sists of a total of eight airlines, Etihad, Etihad’s Equity Partners, and NIKI Luftfahrt 
(which in 2011 merged with Air Berlin), and flies to over 350 destinations worldwide 
(Etihad Airways, 2016b, 2016d). Furthermore, Etihad Airways cooperates with carriers 
from the global airline alliances, including Air France, KLM and Air Canada, and operates 
a total of 46 codeshares (Dunn, 2015). This alliance enables Etihad Airways and its part-
ners to exchange complementary assets and access feeder traffic and more network con-
nections in major European and global markets with Air Berlin (Germany), Alitalia (Italy), 
Virgin Australia (Australia), and Jet Airways (India) (Baker, 2015). In order to differenti-
ate its alliance from the global airline alliances, Etihad Airways’ CEO named its partner-
ship a “large aviation group” (Schaal, 2015). 
Similar to the big three airline alliances, Etihad Airways’ equity partners share sales re-
sources and loyalty programs. Primarily to share knowledge and capabilities, but also to 
avoid negative spillovers, increase efficiency and realize synergies, as well as to achieve 
economies of scale. Etihad Airways uses joint training facilities in Abu Dhabi in order to 
ensure common standards and share knowledge. For example, it conducts the wide body, 
retrofit work, and the 787 pilot training and cabin crew training in its facilities. Further-
more, Air Serbia’s back office is also integrated in its headquarters in the United Arab 
Emirates (Schaal, 2015). By sharing the knowledge and capabilities through the coopera-
tion and also keeping control and supervision over its unequal partners, as well as conduct-
ing joint trainings, Etihad also significantly reduces the risk of negative spillover. Accord-
ing to Hogan, one big disadvantage is the huge duplicate overhead allied airlines face. So 
what they are doing is “looking for centers of excellence” in order to determine the best 
location for one specific task among all the partners and conduct the activity in a shared 
facility at this location (Schaal, 2015). This shows that although Etihad Airways has a very 
low cost structure due to similar reasons as Emirates, distributing risks and sharing costs, 
as well as increasing efficiencies and creating synergies is on the management’s agenda 
and an important factor for forming the alliance. Judging from the information that is pub-
licly available and screened for this study, there does not seem to be a big concern of unin-
tended knowledge transfer or the potential for diminishing diversity of knowledge. This 
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may be due to the fact, that the airline business is capital intensive, rather than knowledge 
intensive, and as Hogan communicates, it is about sharing the otherwise duplicate over-
head than creating completely new products (as may be the case in chemical or IT busi-
nesses). 
Similar to Emirates, as an already world-renowned airline with a very good reputation, 
there is no reason for Etihad Airways to join an airline alliance to improve its legitimacy 
and reputation. Furthermore, Etihad Airways, like Emirates, has significantly influenced 
the worldwide aviation industry. The gulf carriers disrupted the industry with their low-
ticket fares and high quality of service. Joining a global airline alliance, therefore, is not 
necessary to influence the competitive landscape. However, Etihad’s equity partners are 
definitely meant to impact the competitive environment, as it enables Etihad to access 
markets it would not have access to otherwise.  
Even though Etihad Airways has significant equity stakes in other airlines, which it will 
likely expand, the motive to ensure the opportunity to acquire target is not applicable ei-
ther due to the regulations on a national level that were already discussed in the case of 
Emirates. Etihad Airways’ cooperation focuses on the passenger segment and its equity 
alliances clearly focuses solely on the passenger sector (even though Etihad Airways itself 
and some of the participating airlines are also operating in the cargo sector). Therefore, 
entering new markets is not an applicable motive for Etihad Airways to join an alliance. 
International expansion is one of the main chances for Etihad to grow and bring in more 
tourists to its Abu Dhabi hub. However, expanding internationally without partners can be 
very time consuming, as shown in the case of Emirates. Therefore, if Etihad wants to speed 
up the process to catch up to Emirates, cooperating in order to conform to foreign govern-
ment policy is essential. For countries in which this expansion can only be achieved with 
equity acquisitions of local companies, cooperation is essential. Etihad’s commitment to 
this expansion can be seen in it being the first international airline to buy a stake in an In-
dian airline (20% in Jet Airways), after the Indian government imposed a policy, allowing 
foreign ownership of airlines (Rapoza, 2014). 
Based on its state owned status, heavy state funding and the involvement of the royal fami-
ly, the sharing of capital is not a relevant motive for Etihad Airways to join an alliance. 
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The risk of becoming too dependent on a partner is an important factor for Hogan, who 
reasons that Etihad Airways has not joined a global airline alliance because “when you join 
an alliance you’re stuck, that's why we are happy to be non-aligned” (Mouwad, 2015). Eti-
had has found a different way to deal with the partnerships’ inherent problems: All of its 
investments in airlines have in common that they struggle financially. As Hogan says in an 
interview with Schaal (2015) “if we hadn’t invested in Air Berlin or Alitalia they would 
have gone out of business”. By investing money in these airlines and gaining control over 
them, Etihad creates a partner dependency of the other party, without losing control itself, 
which helps Etihad to access and expand markets. Furthermore, with this structure, Etihad 
is able to reduce the risk of underperformance, coordination problems and opportunistic 
behavior as much as possible. According to Hogan, this route to “increase our net worth 
[is] a smarter way […], when you look at net worth, frequent flyer, and unit-cost reduc-
tion” (Schaal, 2015). By selecting the partners of its equity alliance, Etihad Airways can 
also minimize overlap with its current routs, because they otherwise might cut into the air-
lines profitable route network. The airline furthermore can leverage its equity partners’ 
management teams, thereby avoiding higher than anticipated management costs while as-
suring that decisions are made as quickly as possible. 
Qatar Airways 
Qatar Airways, the national airline of Qatar, started operations in 1994. After operating as 
a small regional carrier for three years, it was re-launched as a global carrier under the 
mandate of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Today, the State of Qatar holds a 50% 
stake in the airline, while the rest of it belongs to various private investors. In 2007, Qatar 
Airways launched flights to North America servicing New York and Washington DC, fol-
lowed by Australia in 2009. After launching the first routes to Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo 
in South America, Qatar Airways became one of the few airlines to fly to all six inhabited 
continents. In 2011, Qatar Airways established its 100th destination in Aleppo, Syria. To-
day, it serves 150 destinations. Its modern fleet and its geographical location give it similar 
advantages as Emirates and Etihad Airways. In 2012, Qatar Airways was elected to be-
come a member of the global airline alliance, oneworld. After twelve months of negotia-
tions, in 2013 Qatar Airways officially became the only airline of the three major gulf car-
riers to join an alliance. The objective named by Akbar Al Baker, CEO of the airline, was 
to strengthen its competitiveness and increase customer appeal through the extended net-
work, including increased access to the transatlantic market and bonus programs (Qatar 
  41 
Airways, 2013). Qatar Airways also operates 15 codeshares and owns a 15.01% stake in 
IAG, the parent company of British Airways and Iberia. AIG is important for Qatar Air-
ways, because it provides access to an extensive North American network from London 
and Madrid airports. Therefore, Al Baker announced the possibility of expanding further, 
within the EU’s limit of a 49% stake for foreign investors (Pitas & McKay, 2016). 
Although flying to nearly as many destinations and countries as Emirates, Qatar Airways 
transported a significantly smaller number of passengers in the financial year 2015/2016, 
and in previous years. With 26.6 million passengers, it was far behind Emirates, which 
carried 51.9 million passengers, but ahead of Etihad Airways with 17.6 million passengers 
(see Appendix E: Gulf carrier overview).  
As analyzed above, both Emirates and Etihad Airways have substantive reasons not to join 
a global airline alliance. The following section will examine why Qatar Airways is the only 
major gulf airline that decided to do the opposite and join the oneworld alliance. 
Knowledge and capability sharing is one of the most important reasons according to CEO 
Al Baker, as can be derived from an article posted in The Peninsula (2015). In his opening 
speech of oneworld’s first “Operations Control Conference”, Al Baker pointed out that it is 
“important for [Qatar Airways] to contribute as much as [they] can in all areas of [their] 
business, including operations [-] the backbone of all airlines”. This conference was held to 
enable the collaboration of specialists in each area of business and share “their tremendous 
experience and best practices in operations”. The argumentation is in line with the estab-
lished theory presented in this paper. By collaborating in the form of an alliance, and by 
sharing complementary skills and talents with their partners, Qatar Airways is keen on im-
proving operations in a way that will ultimately “benefit not just its business, but just as 
importantly, [its] passengers in the long run” (The Peninsula, 2015), thereby generating a 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Furthermore, cooperating 
closely and exchanging information on a regular basis also helps the airline to reduce the 
risk of negative spillover. Helmut Weixler, COO of Qatar Airways argues, similarly to 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000), that collaborating in the form of a multilateral alliance, gives 
each partner the chance to contribute to and profit from the broad pool of knowledge of the 
various partners (The Peninsula, 2015). However, according to the available information, 
Qatar Airways does not seem to be afraid of unintended knowledge transfer or the dimin-
ishing diversity of knowledge over time.  
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Although they have a global network, Qatar Airways struggles to bring in as many passen-
gers as Emirates. Therefore, accessing the network of its fellow oneworld members seems 
a viable option to change this fact. Two years after joining oneworld, Al Baker sees proof 
for this step. He says that the exchange of complementary assets (in this case the route 
network of the airlines), “expanded the number of oneworld destinations” by 21%. Fur-
thermore, the “interline revenue secured for the membership of oneworld for all member 
airlines cumulatively” increased by 135% year-over-year (Kingsley-Jones, 2014). In addi-
tion, Qatar Airways is, as mentioned earlier in this paper, invested with a 15.1% equity 
stake in IAG, the parent company of British Airways and Iberia, which provides access to 
an extensive North American network at London and Madrid airports (Pitas & McKay, 
2016). 
There are very few public mentions of the “distribute risks and share costs” objective of 
joining an alliance by Qatar Airways executives. This may partially be due to the strong 
financial situation, based on its state funding. However, as seen in the previous paragraphs, 
Qatar Airways is very much interested in sharing knowledge and capabilities, which will 
eventually lead to lower operation costs. In addition, the creation of “far better facilities 
than any of [the members] could justify on their own, and at better unit costs” is a key ob-
jective for collaboration of the oneworld alliance, as posted on their website. It enables the 
member airlines to increase their efficiency and create synergies. Overall, oneworld mem-
bers “have combined ticket offices, check-in facilities and/or lounges at some 50 airports 
worldwide” (oneworld, 2016). 
Similar to the other two gulf carriers, Qatar Airways has a high reputation and is known for 
its safety and punctuality (Amey, 2015). However, its hub in Doha is a less popular tourist 
destination than the hubs of Emirates and Etihad Airways. According to an analysis of 
CAPA (2015), ”Qatar's Doha hub attracts less point to point traffic than […] Emirates in 
Dubai”. Both its gulf peers only serve their local hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, respective-
ly. This, and Qatar Airways’ focus on business travelers who pay attention to redemption 
opportunities such as loyalty programs of alliances, makes joining an alliance a viable op-
tion to improve its status among travelers. 
As pointed out, it is important for Qatar Airways to develop and expand its route network 
in order to stay competitive. It employs both the oneworld alliance, which, according to an 
interview with oneworld CEO Bruce Ashby aims at becoming the most connected and rel-
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evant [alliance] for the top business centers in the world”, and equity investments such as 
the 15.01% stake in AIG in order to ultimately change the competitive landscape. Due to 
EU restrictions, it is not possible to own more than a 50% stake in European airlines. 
Therefore, its investment cannot be attributed to the motive to ensure the opportunity to 
acquire target. Furthermore, the oneworld alliance does not involve any equity investment. 
Since oneworld is not operating in the cargo sector, the cooperation focuses on the passen-
ger segment, like Emirates and Etihad Airways do. Therefore, entering new markets is not 
an applicable motive for Qatar Airways to join an alliance. 
For Qatar Airways, as much as for Emirates and Etihad, expanding internationally is one 
of the quickest ways to achieve sustainable growth. However, Doha (Qatar) does not natu-
rally attract as many tourists as Dubai or Abu Dhabi, which is why Qatar Airways needs to 
increase its route network to attract business customers. As mentioned earlier, an alliance 
can be the quickest way to add new destinations and to conform to foreign government 
policy. 
Similar to the other two gulf carriers, the sharing of capital is not an applicable motive for 
Qatar Airways to join oneworld. First, the oneworld alliance is contract based, rather than 
equity based and, as described earlier, mainly focused on sharing operational facilities and 
exchanging complementary assets. Moreover, Qatar Airways signaled with its purchases of 
major European airlines that it has significant capital on hand – mainly due to the Emirate 
Qatar’s partial ownership of the airline and the ruling families influence. 
One of the key factors for Qatar Airways’ membership in oneworld is, according to CEO 
Al Baker, the more flexible approach the alliance takes, compared to the Star Alliance and 
SkyTeam. The possibility to form partnerships inside and outside of the alliance gives Qa-
tar Airways’ the option to avoid a significant partner dependence on oneworld. However, 
by joining the alliance, Qatar needs assure that its partnerships are not “detrimental to […] 
oneworld partners” (Kingsley-Jones, 2014). Furthermore, Akbar Al Baker states, “the rea-
son we are so excited about oneworld is that it is the only one of the three alliances that 
does not interfere with your network development or who you codeshare with”. 
Oneworld is the smallest of the three alliances and has the fewest members, which can be 
seen as an indicator that the risk of partner redundancy is less than in the other global air-
line alliances. However, opportunistic behavior is a present risk as could recently be ob-
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served. In 2015, Al Baker has “threatened to exit the oneworld alliance because of actions 
that he said were taken by fellow member American Airlines Group Inc. to block his carri-
er’s business“ (Wall & Ostrower, 2015). He said that “there is no point in […] being in 
oneworld if an airline that invited [and] hosted [them] in America to sign the entry to one-
world, is today going against [them]” (Wall & Ostrower, 2015). 
The oneworld alliance was founded in 1999. Therefore, when joining the alliance man-
agement structures were already set up and in place for many years, implying a reduced 
risk of coordination problems and higher than anticipated management costs. Further-
more, a lot of information about the firms is available and, through the long and existing 
cooperation of the oneworld alliance, the risk of underperformance is reduced, however 
still present. 
4.4 Overview of the case study results 
For a better overview of the case studies, the results for the carrier specific evaluation of 
the motivations (Table 4) and downsides (Table 5) are presented below.  
Table 4: Carrier specific evaluation of motivations 
Motivation Emirates Etihad Airways Qatar Airways 
Share knowledge and 
capabilities 
n/a: Dependency risks 
outweigh benefits, not 
necessary because of 
low cost structure 
Joint training and 
operations facilities 
Initiated “Operations 
Control Conference” 
to share expert 
knowledge among 
alliance partners 
Exchange complemen-
tary assets 
In general, does not fit 
with management’s 
organic growth strate-
gy 
Access feeder traffic 
from smaller airlines 
Necessary to bring 
more business pas-
sengers in, as Doha is 
not as popular among 
tourists 
Distribute risks and 
share costs 
Very low cost struc-
ture, have size to 
achieve economies of 
scale 
Very low cost struc-
ture, aim to reduce 
duplicate overhead in 
equity alliance 
Very low cost struc-
ture, but cost sharing 
is one of the oneworld 
alliance’s main objec-
tives through com-
bined ticket offices, 
check-in facilities and 
lounges 
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Improve legitimacy and 
reputation 
n/a: World renowned 
airline 
n/a: World renowned 
airline 
Also world renowned 
airline, but less popu-
lar among tourists. 
Reputation for busi-
ness travelers through 
better loyalty pro-
grams, etc. 
Influence competitive 
landscape 
n/a: High impact 
through low fares and 
high quality of ser-
vices 
Buy stake of finan-
cially challenged air-
lines but with valua-
ble route networks, to 
put pressure on local 
competitors 
Qatar helps oneworld 
to become the most 
connected and rele-
vant alliance for busi-
ness travelers 
Ensure opportunity to 
acquire target n/a: Not more than 50% of an airline can be owned in most states 
Enter new markets n/a: Alliances considered in this research only operate in the passen-ger transport segment 
Expand internationally 
Cooperation in rare 
instances, otherwise 
lobby for fifth/ sixth 
freedom right and 
exploit existing routes 
Bring in more tourists 
through access to new 
destinations and feed-
er traffic 
Alliance provides 
access to business 
travelers 
Conform to foreign 
government policy 
Cooperation in rare 
instances, otherwise 
lobby for fifth/ sixth 
freedom right and 
exploit existing routes 
Mixture of alliance 
and expansion ap-
proach: Buying max. 
allowed stake in air-
lines 
Allying only (quick) 
way to access some 
markets 
Increase efficiency and 
realize synergies 
n/a: Very low cost 
structure due to new 
fleet, low taxes, etc. 
à have size to 
achieve Economies of 
Scale 
Joint training facilities 
of equity partners, 
“looking for centers 
of excellence” to re-
duce duplicate over-
head 
Operation Control 
Conference to ex-
change best practices 
of industry leaders 
within the alliance. 
Oneworld shares 
lounges and opera-
tional facilities 
Share capital n/a: Due to significant support and investment of the states 
 
Table 5: Carrier specific evaluation of downsides 
Downside Emirates Etihad Airways Qatar Airways 
Unintended knowledge 
transfer 
No information avail-
able 
Not a big factor in the 
alliance decision 
Not a big factor in the 
alliance decision 
Diminishing diversity of 
knowledge 
No information avail-
able 
Not a big factor in the 
alliance decision 
Not a big factor in the 
alliance decision 
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Partner dependence Threat to independ-ence and flexibility 
Limiting own depend-
ence through “one-
way” equity invest-
ments 
Oneworld’s more 
flexible approach 
allows partnerships 
in- and outside of 
alliance 
Partner redundancy 
Overlap of routes / 
sacrificing traffic for 
the alliance 
Investment in strate-
gically important re-
gions (not more as in 
alliance) 
Oneworld is the 
smallest of the global 
airline alliances 
Opportunistic behavior No information avail-able 
Limited through equi-
ty involvement 
Occurred once with 
American Airlines, 
present risk for Qatar 
Negative spillover 
Threat to its reputa-
tion and high quality 
of service 
Joint training and 
operations facilities to 
reduce this risk 
Initiating knowledge 
and capability sharing 
Underperformance 
Threat to its reputa-
tion and high quality 
of service 
Limited through equi-
ty involvement 
Cooperation within 
oneworld alliance has 
been going for many 
years 
Coordination problems No information avail-able 
Limited through equi-
ty involvement 
Management struc-
tures in oneworld 
alliance already in 
place and working 
Higher than anticipated 
management costs 
No information avail-
able 
Leverage through 
equity ownership, 
assuring decisions to 
be made as quick as 
possible 
Management struc-
tures in oneworld 
alliance already in 
place and working 
 
Summarizing, the analysis shows that although all gulf carriers make use of interfirm co-
operation, Etihad Airways is the one that relies on it the most, especially with respect to 
growth. Instead of a “traditional” membership in global airline alliances, they rather focus 
on collaborations that involve equity stakes in all of their partners. 
5 Discussion 
The different strategic involvements in alliances and the distinct designs of alliance struc-
tures illustrate the impact of each management’s assessment or perception of potential op-
portunities and risks. Prior literature gives little indication, which factors specifically influ-
ence the airline’s perception of motivations and downsides and therefore the design of the 
cooperation. This paper assumes that the relative importance of the motivations and down-
sides varies with several underlying key factors. Based on the literature review and its re-
flection against individual case-companies, the findings suggest that the key factors are 
airline cost structure, network structure, target passenger group, alliance type, alliance 
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governance, and partner characteristics. Some of the key factors were already included in 
the conceptual framework presented in chapter 4. However, it needs to be advanced with 
the aforementioned empirical insights (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Conceptual framework with underlying key factors 
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Airline cost structure 
One of the main distinguishing factors of gulf carriers, compared to network carriers, is 
their very low cost structure. The overhead of Lufthansa and other network carriers is sig-
nificantly higher, in which case cost sharing is much more likely to be the dominant or a 
very relevant objective for allying (Sakakibara, 1997). Although gulf carriers realize cost 
savings and economies of scale wherever possible (Etihad Airways’ joint training facilities 
and Qatar’s Operation Control Conference), network access is much more crucial to the 
alliance decision. As determined in the case study, the incentive to ally in order to distrib-
ute risks and share costs and/ or to increase efficiency and realize synergies is small and 
rather a side benefit of the main reasons to join an alliance for the gulf carriers. Therefore, 
the following is proposed: 
Proposition 1: If the cost structure of an airline is significantly lower than the industry 
average, the airline is less likely to join a global airline alliance. 
 
Network structure 
The main reasons why the management of Emirates and Etihad Airways opposes the deci-
sion to join an alliance is the limitation to grow only in areas that also benefit other alliance 
partners, or at least does not harm them. Although existing research, such as the studies by 
Iatrou and Oretti (2012), Jangkrajarng (2011), and Oum and Park (1997), suggests that an 
alliance serves as a means to expand an airlines market, the gulf carriers show that it is 
possible to also significantly grow through the freedom rights and bilateral agreements 
with the respective countries. This type of growth is what the management team of Emir-
ates calls organic or sustainable growth. One significant disadvantage for global airline 
alliances is that they require the airlines to go through the hub of the airline responsible for 
the local market, thereby limiting further expansion to new markets of the alliance. It can 
therefore be assumed that further deregulation will increase competition and give gulf car-
riers significant points to attack. 
Proposition 2: If less institutional barriers exist in the (aviation) market, airlines are more 
likely to form competitive coalitions then to form/ join global airline alliances. 
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Target passenger group 
The target passenger group is, as shown in the case study, closely related to the aim to ex-
pand internationally. The airlines choose the new destinations based on their main type of 
customer, which also influences the form of inter-organizational cooperation. Furthermore, 
the gulf carriers implement new destinations in regions that are underserved or not served 
at all by network carriers. These destinations – called secondary cities – possess great po-
tential, as the gulf carriers can specifically tailor their offering to the needs of the leisure 
and/or business travelers and become a new option for them to connect. As previously 
suggested, the gulf carriers, i.e. Emirates and Etihad Airways, would not be able to access 
these destinations if they were a part of a global airline alliance. 
Proposition 3: Airlines that aim at offering a more diversified destination portfolio are less 
likely to become part of a global airline alliance, and rather form their own cooperative 
agreements. 
 
Alliance type 
The case study shows that although the gulf carriers’ involvement in alliances varies sig-
nificantly, none of them disregards inter-organizational cooperation completely. The type 
of alliance is what separates the different strategies. While Emirates prefers very few bilat-
eral codeshare agreements (and a joint venture with Qantas, with very limited scope), Eti-
had Airways has acquired significant equity stakes of its equity partner airlines and Qatar 
Airways is part of the oneworld alliance. Qatar Airways’ oneworld involvement is con-
tract-based and therefore much more flexible. However, as discussed before, Qatar Air-
ways already experienced the risks of less commitment in the form of American Airlines’ 
opportunism. The empirical evidence from the case study supports the claims of Wassmer, 
Dussauge, and Planellas (2010) and Wassmer and Dussauge (2012) that joining an alliance 
alone does not create value itself, but rather the correct alignment and configuration of the 
alliance portfolio. Each airline itself needs to adapt its cooperation in a way in which it best 
sees fit.  
The gulf carriers are focused on staying autonomous and avoiding dependencies. By con-
ducting minority equity investments, they avoid the typical problems that non-equity alli-
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ances bring with them, as for example pointed out by T. K. Das and Teng (1996). Although 
following different strategies, Emirates and Etihad Airways both focus on building long-
term relationships to expand their network, especially Etihad Airways employing equity 
ownership as a key factor in its expansion strategy. The equity stakes Etihad Airways ac-
quired over the last years has led to a cross-border merger type of situation, meaning that it 
has a significant leverage on its equity partners, further magnified through their financial 
situation – within the regulatory boundaries of not owning more than 49% of an airline. 
Alliances of this kind where one airline acts as a leader might become more important in 
the next years, as long as actual mergers are restricted. 
Proposition 4: An alliance between an airline with a strong financial situation and a fi-
nancially challenged airline leads, if it includes a significant equity investment, to a mer-
ger type of situation. 
 
Alliance governance 
According to the model by Albers (2010) that was presented earlier in this study, the three 
structural dimensions to consider in the alliance governance are the degrees of centraliza-
tion, specialization, and formalization. As Qatar Airways’ CEO Al Baker said, the main 
reason Qatar Airways opted to join oneworld was their more flexible approach, compared 
to the Star Alliance or SkyTeam (Iatrou & Oretti, 2016; Kingsley-Jones, 2014; Pilling, 
2005).  
As abovementioned, the setup of the oneworld alliance, with a high centralization and spe-
cialization is in line with the Star Alliance and SkyTeam (Albers, Koch, & Ruff, 2005; Star 
Alliance, 2016b; Tjemkes, Vos, & Burgers, 2013). The difference between the alliances is 
in the formalization, where oneworld provides its members with more flexibility than Star 
Alliance and SkyTeam. In general, if the formalization and specialization is high, it be-
comes less important to find a perfect partner in regards to partner compatibility and com-
mitment. This is due to the fact that more attention is paid to control mechanisms and the 
existence of mediators, such as the alliance manager and support staff. These alliance func-
tions can help to reduce information asymmetries and enhance communication. Therefore, 
only partners willing to commit to such a system will attempt to join such an alliance. In 
other words: 
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Proposition 5: Airline alliances with complex governance systems (high formalization and 
specialization) will have member airlines with a high commitment to the alliance. 
However, following the strategy of oneworld and the argumentation of Qatar Airways, a 
lower formalization will positively affect the growth of the individual member airlines, 
while still providing the general advantages of the other global airline alliances, such as 
synergy effects, better connections for customers and enhanced frequent flier programs, 
which lead to proposition 6: 
Proposition 6: Member airlines of alliances with a less formalized governance structure 
will have higher individual growth rates than member airlines of alliances with highly 
formalized governance structures.  
 
Partner characteristics 
The problem between Qatar Airways and American Airlines that was discussed in this case 
does confirm existing theory, which suggests that alliance partners who maintain coopera-
tion outside the strategic alliance have a lower commitment to the alliance itself, which at 
some point may lead to problems within the alliance (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
& Borgatti, 1998; Lavie et al., 2007). However, contrary to Lazzarini’s (2008) assumption 
that such airlines would avoid multilateral alliances in order to maintain their ties to other 
partners, the case of the oneworld alliance with 17 years of operation since 1999 shows 
that – besides some issues – an alliance can be stable, even with such a setup. This shows 
that other factors besides the partner commitment are important for a successful collabora-
tion. In the literature review of this study, these were determined to be partner complemen-
tarity and partner compatibility (Kale & Singh, 2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Be-
sides the open approach of oneworld, there are several deep ties, such as joint ventures, 
that grew out of the cooperation within the alliance. This shows that less commitment does 
not necessarily jeopardize the strategic alliance. It rather suggests that the other two factors 
may be able to compensate for an initial deficit in commitment. As such, a high partner 
complementarity within the alliance would, in the case of airline alliances for example in-
dicate very different route networks, may be able to compensate less commitment. As each 
partner has to pass extensive screening before being admitted to a global airline alliance, 
the compatibility of the partners in terms of organizational culture and communication 
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should assure that there is a high compatibility, i.e. between the new member and the alli-
ance group. 
Proposition 7: A low commitment to the alliance, in the form of cooperation with outside 
partners, may not harm the alliance if partner complementarity and compatibility is high. 
 
Beside the key factors analyzed above, the development of competitive coalitions in the 
aviation industry is an interesting phenomenon observed in this study. The concept of 
competitive coalitions, as described by Doz and Hamel (1998) fits very well to the strategy 
of the gulf carriers. Etihad Airways, for example, with its equity partner alliances appears 
to have already formed a competitive coalition. Emirates is on the same track, but is form-
ing the coalition with fewer partners, while Qatar Airways is still building cooperation with 
several partners inside and outside the alliance. If the suggested evolution by Doz and 
Hamel (1998) is correct, which this case study indicates, than this provides interesting im-
plications for the upcoming development of the aviation industry. The deeper cooperation 
through joint ventures allows the airlines to further integrate cost and revenue sharing 
mechanisms and therefore, as the alliance moves closer to the setup of a single firm, reduc-
es the transaction costs. Thus, competitive coalitions become increasingly important, as 
well as more economically valuable than multilateral alliances, therefore influencing the 
decision to join an alliance. 
Proposition 8: Airlines that form or join competitive coalitions of few, very heterogenic 
airlines, outperform members of global airline alliances in terms of revenue and growth 
rates. 
6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to synthesize the existing literature on motivations and 
downsides of allying and to apply them to gulf carriers. The underlying assumption was 
that a variety of factors influence the “to ally or not” decision. Based on the thorough 
search of EBSCO’s business source complete with 2,027 relevant search results, four main 
categories of the reasons to ally were derived, namely: innovation, market consolidation, 
business expansion, and business operation. Each of these categories was further reduced 
to more specific and tangible motivations. As stated previously, several studies exist that 
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summarize the motivations and downsides of joining an alliance, however none of them 
provided a systemic synthesis. Furthermore, the majority of studies only analyze up to 
three motivations and/ or downsides in one study. The analysis also confirms the prior as-
sumption that little attention has been given to the downsides.  
The identified motivations in the category of innovation revolve around motivations relat-
ed to new product development and knowledge sharing. Through alliances, companies aim 
to share knowledge and capabilities in order to access complementary skill sets and talents, 
and ultimately develop new technologies and/or services (e.g. Contractor & Lorange, 1988; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The exchange and access of complementary assets at-
tempts to fill resource gaps, which cannot be easily filled with arms-length market transac-
tions. Another objective may be to push the development of a new product/ expand the 
current product range, which is hard to accomplish without a partner (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; 
Chung et al., 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1994). 
Alliances are also used to distribute risks and share costs when, for example the new prod-
uct development process inherits significant risks of failure, that one company alone does 
not or cannot undertake. With regard to the category of market consolidation, the intention 
to change the market environment by increasing the company’s market power and/ or posi-
tion through cooperation with other companies is the leading force. More specifically, this 
can be achieved through improving the legitimacy and reputation as new markets entrants 
may face credibility and trust hurdles, which alliances can help to overcome (e.g. Baum et 
al., 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 2000).  
In addition, alliances can be the vehicle of choice to influence the competitive landscape, 
as two or more companies can exert their market power together and therefore achieve 
cheaper purchasing rates from suppliers or simply draw competitors out of the market (e.g. 
Fuller & Porter, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1994). If a takeover of a company is not feasible 
or possible at the moment, alliances can also ensure the opportunity to acquire a target, if 
one alliance partner purchases equity of the other, thereby positioning itself for a takeover 
(e.g. Folta, 1998).  
In the case where markets are inaccessible or heavily regulated, alliances can also foster 
business expansion. New markets can be entered and products can be sold either through 
the alliance partner or the company itself with help and justification of the partner (e.g. 
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Mitchell et al., 2002; Reuer & Tong, 2010). In heavily regulated or culturally distant envi-
ronments, alliances can significantly reduce the time it takes to expand internationally and 
increase the rate of success” (e.g. Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hill et 
al., 1990). Similarly, especially in the highly regulated environment, alliances can be the 
only way to conform to foreign government policy. From a business operational perspec-
tive, inter-organizational cooperation helps to increase efficiency and realize synergies 
through joint activities and internalization of market transaction, as well as sharing capital 
when costs of capital or investments are specifically high (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999; Hitt et al., 2000; Miles & Snow, 1984). 
Like the motivations, the synthesized downsides of allying are also clustered into catego-
ries, namely: innovation, market consolidation and business expansion, and business op-
eration. These categories are also reduced to more specific and tangible downsides.  
Innovational activities bear the risks of unintended knowledge transfer of critical 
knowledge and competencies. Cooperation requires the partners to provide access to their 
respective knowledge pools, which bears the risk of unintended spillover (e.g. Hamel et al., 
1989; Kale et al., 2000; Williamson, 1991). Furthermore, the pool of knowledge that is 
shared may diminish over time, leading to a depreciation of the value of cooperation as the 
cooperating firms become increasingly alike (e.g. Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000).  
Market consolidation and business expansion related downsides include risks associated 
with changing market environments and new (international) market entries. Intense coop-
eration may leave one of the partners dependent on the other, either through high switching 
costs or because distinct capabilities in the area that the partner manages decrease (e.g. 
Hamel et al., 1989; Nooteboom et al., 1997). In a longer cooperation, partners tend to be-
come more and more alike, in terms of their once heterogeneous pools of knowledge, or in 
the multilateral case through the addition of new partners that partially possess the same or 
similar knowledge (e.g. Baum et al., 2000; Luo & Deng, 2009).  
Alliances also always inherent the risk of opportunistic behavior, meaning the chance that 
one of the partners takes a chance at the expense of another partner (e.g. Gulati, 1998; 
Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). In addition, negative spillover effects, due to one partner’s 
insufficient service or quality of products may also harm the companies involved in the 
alliance (e.g. Bourdeau et al., 2007; Ozmel et al., 2013). From a business operation stand-
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point, alliance partners may (unintentionally) not perform as expected. This underperfor-
mance may become apparent through goals that are not achieved, deadlines that are not 
met, or lacking commitment to the common objectives of the alliance (e.g. T. K. Das & 
Teng, 1996; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; Mariti & Smiley, 1983; Sakakibara, 1997). If the 
alliance partners fail to coordinate their activities sufficiently, the resulting problems will 
lead to a diminishing effectiveness of the alliance (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1994). Finally, 
higher than anticipated management costs can result from insufficient or ineffective gov-
ernance mechanisms (e.g. Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Lavie et al., 2007). 
The analysis has not only conducted a meta-analysis of the different motivations and 
downsides of joining an alliance, but it has also included the theoretical lenses most com-
monly used when analyzing the motives and downsides. The resource-based view, the the-
ory of organizational learning, the social network theory, and the transaction cost theory 
are the four theories that are most commonly used by researchers and together make up 
69% of the total studies analyzed. The remaining 31% of the studies include arguments 
from strategic management (such as competitive force and dynamic capabilities), the 
knowledge-based view, the real options theory, and the agency theory. As aforementioned, 
the majority of studies are empirical in nature, and determine the alliance outcomes meas-
ured on the basis of one objective (e.g. share knowledge and capabilities). Determining 
specific motives and downsides and their impact is seldom the main focus of a study (e.g. 
Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Sakakibara, 1997). 
The majority of the findings are based on dyadic alliances, therefore this study attempted 
to also take current research of multilateral alliances and alliance portfolios into account. 
Overall, similar chances and risks persist in the multilateral perspective. However, both are 
magnified when a higher number of partners are involved. Greater combined knowledge 
pools may more quickly lead to innovations and collaboration opportunities, and synergies 
can be realized as companies combine their business support activities, but it can also in-
crease the effect of the downsides summarized above (e.g. Ding et al., 2013; Doz & 
Hamel, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Soh, 2010). Overall, balancing 
cooperation and competition is a highly challenging task for the alliance in this case and 
the so called “coopetition” is one of the recently emerging fields of research (e.g. 
Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011; Himpel, 2012; Nalebuff, 
Brandenburger, & Maulana, 1996; Tsai, 2002). 
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The case study yielded several insights on why Emirates and Etihad Airways choose not to 
join any of the global airline alliances. While prior literature gives little indication, which 
factors specifically influence the airline’s perception of motivations and downsides in the 
aviation industry, this study suggests several underlying factors for the alliance decision, 
namely: the airline cost structure, network structure, target passenger group, alliance type, 
alliance governance, and partner characteristics. On a more general note, it can be summa-
rized that Emirates has very little incentive to join a global airline alliance due to its excep-
tional position as the biggest gulf carrier with great (state backed) financial resources. The 
management specific views, which reject the option to ally, also plays a major role in 
Emirates’ refusal to join an alliance. However, as shown, this does not mean that Emirates 
disregards cooperation completely. Its revenue-sharing partnership with Qantas, as well as 
a very selective codesharing network, indicate that Emirates will choose to work with part-
ners when it benefits them, even if the cases are rare.  
For Etihad Airways, there are certain valuable benefits to join an alliance, even though the 
management has a critical view towards the global airline alliances. This argument leads to 
the explanation of the decision to form an equity alliance with much more control over its 
partners in order to limit exposure of the disadvantages of traditional alliance formations. 
Forming its own equity alliance allows Etihad Airways to shift the group’s fleet of about 
700 aircrafts between the partners as needed. More importantly, it allows Etihad to access 
markets, whereas obtaining fifth, sixth, or seventh freedom rights would have taken much 
longer. Qatar Airways’ decision to join the oneworld global airline alliance is also mainly 
based on the objective to access new markets and expand its route network for valuable 
business travelers. The choice can also be explained by the unique setup of the oneworld 
alliance. As discussed, the lower standardization of the oneworld alliance compared to the 
Star Alliance and SkyTeam gives its members more options to cooperate outside of the 
alliance and keep a higher level of autonomy. 
Based on the knowledge gained through conducting the case study, several general reasons 
for Emirates’ and Etihad Airways’ decision not to join a global airline alliance can be de-
rived. First, although not one of the main factors for the thriving gulf carriers, the good 
strategic position of the hubs is an enabler of their strategy. Second, the gulf carriers main-
ly offer medium- and long-haul flights, with little to no unprofitable short distance flights. 
These flights are carried out by codesharing partners (Emirates) or alliances partners in the 
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oneworld alliance (Qatar Airways) and Etihad’s equity partner alliance. Third, the gulf 
carriers value autonomy, reflected in their choices to either not ally at all or choose alliance 
designs that benefit them while maintaining control. Fourth, active partnerships are essen-
tial in the gulf carriers’ strategy. Emirates maintains a very small partner portfolio, as is the 
case for Etihad Airways, too. Qatar Airways also has only limited partners outside the 
oneworld alliance and takes great care during the selection process. Fifth, the gulf airlines 
profit from the ongoing deregulation of the industry, enabling forms of cooperation and 
expansion that would not have been possible at the turn of the millennium when the global 
airline alliances were founded. Sixth, complementary networks are a very important crite-
rion for the alliance partner selection whereby the gulf carriers avoid route overlaps. Sev-
enth, gulf carriers expand their network not only to primary cities, but also through sec-
ondary cities that are currently underserved. In addition, they employ seventh freedom 
rights to expand their route network not only through new spokes that are directly connect-
ed to the hub, but also indirectly. Finally, the business friendly environment in the gulf 
states, with less regulatory demands and taxes, as well as lower labor costs compared to 
other markets, combined with significant investments of the states, provides these carriers 
with a competitive advantage. 
Contrary to what was long the prevailing view in the aviation industry, the gulf carriers 
show that good firm performance without joining a global airline alliance is possible, po-
tentially causing a paradigm shift in the industry and kick starting an era of fewer but clos-
er collaborations, as anticipated by Hamel et al. (1989). The application of the motivations 
and downsides to the case showed, that the organic growth strategy fits very well within 
existing alliance theory, and the strategic differences between traditional network carriers 
and the gulf carriers mainly lay in the management specific views and their more advanced 
perception of how alliances are set up. This is fostered through their recent expansion, 
which started way after the establishment of the global airline alliances and which may 
limit other network carriers through partner dependence (e.g. lock-in effects) and other 
factors discussed in this study to follow a similar strategy. The assumption of Emirates’ 
and Etihad Airways’ management that (global) airline alliances hinder growth is mainly 
based on their aim to avoid partner dependencies in terms of network development, nega-
tive spillovers and opportunistic behaviors. 
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Inevitably, due to the type of this study and its scope, there are several limitations to this 
study. First, the approach of the literature review limited the results to journals with an A-
ranking or higher, according to the VHB-JOURQUAL3, which inevitable left other excel-
lent management journals and articles published in them out of the picture. Second, the 
material for the case study was obtained from secondary sources. Due to missing access to 
the management of the gulf carriers, no interviews to discuss their specific thinking on 
single motives and downsides could be conducted. Finally, the information used in the case 
was of only qualitative nature. A further analysis using qualitative and quantitative data 
might shed further light on the issue.  
Practical implications 
The findings in this study also provide some insights for management. The most likely 
scenario for the further evolvement of the airline industry seems to be a slow, but steady, 
deregulation of the industry. In the meantime, joint ventures and equity investments will 
become increasingly important to access aspiring markets such as Africa, China, or India, 
while mergers are still prohibited by regulatory authorities. It is likely that also airlines that 
currently are members in global airline alliances, will increasingly attempt to form joint 
ventures. An example of this can be observed at the time of writing this study, with 
Lufthansa taking over 1/3 of AirBerlin’s flights (Flottau, 2016). It is important for man-
agement in the airline business to closely observe the developments and assess the increas-
ingly feasible option to joint venture that was not possible when the global airline alliances 
were founded. It is not likely that there will be a disruptive change in the industry, but the 
global airline alliance’s survival will significantly depend on how their ability to deepen 
cooperation and limit partner redundancy within the alliance. The gulf carriers lead the 
way in this regard, and Etihad is a step ahead of the competition on this timeline, since 
they already form competitive coalitions, instead of joining a multi-partner alliance. 
Future research 
The studies analyzed in the literature review mainly focus on alliances between only two 
parties. Even though, as discussed, the results are applicable to the multilateral case, future 
research should further analyze the results with specific attention to multi-partner alliances. 
Overall, the findings imply that existing theory is outdated with regard to airline alliances. 
Carriers that do not join a global airline alliance are no longer isolated, nor are they in a 
unfavorable competitive position (Button et al., 1998; Mak & Go, 1995). Moreover, it 
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would be a stretch to call Emirates and Etihad Airways niche players, because of their 
avoidance of global airline alliances. However, other factors, such as the gulf carrier’s reli-
ance on the heavy subsidies of the gulf states, should be kept in mind (Oum & Park, 1997). 
In addition, due to the limited scope of this study, much more could have been written on 
the results of the systemic literature review. Future research may continue on this path and 
focus on the theoretical background of the motivations and downsides. Last but not least, 
several propositions were developed in this study and suggestions were made with regards 
to the varying relative importance of the motivations and downsides based on the underly-
ing key factors airline cost structure, network structure, target passenger group, alliance 
type, alliance governance, and partner characteristics. These propositions should at some 
point be empirically tested. 
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Appendix A: Global airline alliance overview 
 Star Alliance SkyTeam oneworld 
Founded in 1997 1999 1999 
Revenue $196bn $156bn $148bn 
Operating profit $8.9bn $4.2bn $4.0bn 
Net profit $3.7bn $0.5bn $2.1bn 
Destinations 1,213 1,037 954 
Countries served 192 177 154 
# of members 28 20 15 
Market share 24.0% 20.8% 19.0% 
Capacity (ASK) 38.8bn 31.3bn 28.5bn 
 
ASK = Available seat kilometer 
Source: Adapted from Dunn (2015, p. 41) 
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Appendix B: Star Alliance member airlines 
Airline Country Hubs Member Since IATA 
Adria Airways Slovenia Ljubljana 2004 JP 
Aegean Airlines Greece Athens, Thessaloniki, Herakli-
on 
2010 A3 
Air Canada Canada Calgary, Montréal, Toronto & 
Vancouver 
1997 AC 
Air China China Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai & 
Guangzhou 
2007 CA 
Air India India Mumbai, New Delhi, Kolkata 2014 AI 
Air New Zealand New Zealand Auckland 1999 NZ 
All Nippon Air-
ways 
Japan Tokyo, Osaka 1999 NH 
Asiana Airlines South Korea Seoul, Incheon 2003 OZ 
Austrian Airlines Austria Vienna 2000 OS 
Avianca Colombia, El 
Salvador, and 
Peru 
Bogotá, San Salvador, and 
Lima 
2012 AV 
Brussels Airlines Belgium Brussels 2015 SN 
Copa Airlines Panama Panama City 2012 CM 
Croatia Airlines Croatia Zagreb 2004 OU 
Egypt Air Egypt Cairo 2008 MS 
EVA Airways Taiwan Taipei 2013 BR 
Ethiopian Airlines Ethiopia Addis Ababa 2009 ET 
LOT Poland Warsaw 2003 LO 
Lufthansa Germany Frankfurt & Munich 1997 LH 
SAS Denmark, Nor-
way, Sweden 
Copenhagen, Oslo & Stock-
holm 
1997 SK 
Shenzhen Airlines China Shenzhen 2012 ZH 
Singapore Air-
lines 
Singapore Singapore 2000 SQ 
South African 
Airways 
South Africa Johannesburg, Cape Town 2006 SA 
Swiss Interna-
tional 
Switzerland Zurich 2006 LX 
TAP Portugal Portugal Lisbon 2005 TP 
Thai Airways Thailand Bangkok 1997 TG 
Turkish Airlines Turkey Istanbul 2008 TK 
United Airlines United States Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, 
Guam, Houston, Los Angeles, 
Newark, San Francisco, Tokyo, 
Washington, D.C. 
1997 UA 
Source: Adapted from Dunn (2015, pp. 40-45)   
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Appendix C: SkyTeam member airlines 
Airline Country Hubs Member Since IATA 
Aeroflot Russia Moscow 2006 SU 
Aerolíneas Ar-
gentinas 
Argentina Buenos Aires 2012 AR 
Aeroméxico Mexico Mexico City & Monterrey 2000 AM 
Air Europa Spain Madrid 2007 UX 
Air France France Paris 2007 AF 
Alitalia Italy Rome 2001 AZ 
China Airlines Taiwan Taipei 2011 CI 
China Eastern China Shanghai 2011 MU 
China Southern 
Airlines 
China Beijing, Guangzhou 2007 CZ 
Czech Airlines Czech Republic Prague 2001 OK 
Delta Air Lines United States of 
America, Nether-
lands, and Japan 
Minneapolis, Detroit, Mem-
phis, Tokyo, Amsterdam, Cin-
cinnati, Atlanta, New York & 
Salt Lake City 
2000 DL 
Kenya Airways Kenya Nairobi 2007 KQ 
KLM Netherlands Amsterdam 2000 KL 
Korean Air South Korea Seoul 2000 KE 
Middle East Air-
lines 
Lebanon Beirut 2012 ME 
Saudia Saudi Arabia Jeddah, Dammam & Riyadh 2012 SV 
TAROM Romania Bucharest 2010 RO 
Vietnam Airlines Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi 2010 VN 
Xiamen Airlines China Xiamen 2012 MF 
Garuda Indonesia Indonesia Jakarta 2014 GA 
Source: Adapted from Dunn (2015, pp. 40-45)  
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Appendix D: oneworld member airlines 
Airline Country Hubs Member Since IATA 
Air Berlin Germany Berlin, Düsseldorf & Palma de 
Mallorca 
2012 AB 
American Air-
lines 
United States Dallas, New York, St. Louis, 
San Juan, Miami & Chicago 
1998 AA 
British Airways United Kingdom London 1998 BA 
Cathay Pacific Hong Kong Hong Kong 1998 CX 
Finnair Finland Helsinki 2000 AY 
Iberia Spain Madrid 2000 IB 
Japan Airlines Japan Tokyo & Osaka 2007 JL 
LAN Airlines Chile Santiago 2000 LA 
Malaysian Air-
lines 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 2012 MH 
Qantas Australia Sydney & Melbourne 1998 QF 
Qatar Airways Qatar Doha 2013 QR 
Royal Jordanian Jordan Amman 2007 RJ 
S7 Airlines Russia Moscow (Domodedovo), No-
vosibirsk, Irkutsk 
2010 S7 
SriLankan Air-
lines 
Sri Lanka Colombo 2014 UL 
TAM Brazil São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bra-
silia 
2014 JJ 
Source: Adapted from Dunn (2015, pp. 40-45)  
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Appendix E: Gulf carrier overview 
 Emirates Etihad Airways Qatar Airways 
Founded in 1985 2003 1993 
Revenue $25.3bn $9.02bn $9.79bn  
Operating profit $2.56bn  $0.259 $0.84bn 
Destinations 151 117 150 
Countries served 80 68 75 
# of passengers 51.9m  17.6m 26.6m 
Capacity (ASK) 333.7m  104.8m 151.9m 
 
ASK = Available seat kilometer 
Source: Emirates (2016a); Etihad Airways (2015, 2016a); Qatar Airways (2016) 
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Appendix F: Case study material overview 
Source* Type Content summary and case relation 
Al-Kibsi et al. 
(2007) 
Mag Economic information on the gulf states to show the advantages of the 
gulf states compared with other states 
Amey (2015) NP Reliability ratings of various carriers to derive the young fleet age of 
the gulf carriers and Qatar as the most reliable airline 
Baker (2015) NP Comments on Etihad Airways’ view of alliances and its equity partner 
alliance to get information on the feeder traffic Etihad Airways can 
access through its equity partner alliance 
CAPA (2013) IA Analysis of Etihad Airways’ acquisition of Swiss regional carrier, as a 
way to access feeder traffic without being member of a global airline 
alliance 
CAPA (2014) IA Unit cost analysis of Emirates, IAG & Virgin, to show competitive 
advantages of Emirates and the gulf carriers 
CAPA (2015) IA Overview of the gulf carrier’s passenger intake from airports in the 
UAE and around the world, to compare the three gulf carriers 
Cronin and El 
Gazzar (2015) 
NP Citation of Emirates’ president Tim Clark on airline alliances to em-
phasize the concern that joining a global airline alliance would be a 
threat to Emirates’ flexibility 
Dunn (2015) Mag Yearly overview of alliance and joint venture evolvement in the airline 
industry, including changes to the existing member base to get an 
overview of the cooperation of the gulf carriers and their established 
codeshare agreements 
Emirates (2012) Pres Statement on allegations of the gulf carriers with regards to govern-
mental subsidies in order to take both sides into account (as compared 
to i.e. Partnership for Open & Fair Skies (2016)) 
Emirates (2015a) PR New, ambitious, fleet retirement schedule of Emirates keeping average 
fleet age low to show difference in fleet age between Emirates and 
other carriers 
Emirates (2015b) PR Emirates’ financial performance, showing it made a profit for 27 con-
secutive years, to provide quantitative support for high growth rates 
Emirates (2016a) AR Financial and corporate information on Emirates to get information on 
fleet age and provide quantitative support for high growth rates 
Emirates (2016b) Web Emirates’ corporate history, summarizing the time from foundation to 
today, used in the introduction of the case narrative 
Emirates (2016c) Web Emirates’ corporate history, summarized in important milestones, used 
in the introduction of the case narrative 
Etihad Airways 
(2016b) 
Web Corporate profile with information on the Etihad equity partners, to 
develop a basic idea about the airline and to be used in the introduction 
of the case narrative 
Etihad Airways 
(2016c) 
Web Corporate profile with information on vision, awards and partners, to 
develop a basic idea about the airline and to be used in the introduction 
of the case narrative 
Etihad Airways 
(2016d) 
Web Customer advantages of the Etihad equity partner alliance for number 
of destinations and gaining deeper understanding of the alliance itself 
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Heasley (2010) NP Statements of Emirates’ SVP Vaughn on the airline and its position 
towards alliances, suggesting possible negative impacts of alliance 
membership for Emirates 
IATA (2014) Web Overview of the last 100 years of commercial flight with critical mile-
stones, to detail the protectionist barriers and ongoing deregulation of 
the airline industry 
Kingsley-Jones 
(2014) 
Mag Analysis of alliance opportunities and Qatar Airways’ motivation to 
join oneworld, to provide the suggested cumulative 135% year-over-
year growth of interline revenue secured for the membership of one-
world for all member airlines 
Lohade (2015) NP Analysis of Emirates’ quarterly report and the influence of lower fuel 
costs, as well as the proximity to oil production 
Mouwad (2015) NP Citation of Etihad’s CEO Hogan and comparison of Etihad to other 
airlines, to show the perceived risk of partner dependency  
oneworld (2016) Web Introduction to oneworld with information on the benefits for custom-
ers and member airlines 
Parker and Kerr 
(2013) 
NP Article on the rapid expansion of Emirates and the other gulf carriers, 
their cost advantages, strategy and other supporting factors 
Pitas and McKay 
(2016) 
NP Information on Qatar Airways’ purchase of IAG equity stake, raising it 
to 15.01 percent, to quote CEO Al Baker on future plans of expanding 
equity ownership within the EU’s limit of a 49% stake for foreign in-
vestors 
Qatar Airways 
(2013) 
PR Announcement of Qatar Airways’ new oneworld membership, to be 
used as company statement with general reasons for the decision to ally 
and potential future benefits of the cooperation 
Rapoza (2014) Mag Analysis of the gulf states’ airline alliances and their advantages in the 
aviation market with references to Emirates’ cooperation with Qantas 
Schaal (2015) NP Interview with Etihad CEO Hogan on disrupting alliances and the pas-
senger experience to differentiate the Etihad equity partner alliance 
from the global airline alliances 
The Peninsula 
(2015) 
NP Information on the first oneworld operations conference, hosted by 
Qatar Airways to show its interest in creating synergies and sharing 
knowledge 
Wall and Ostrower 
(2015) 
NP Information on the dispute between Qatar Airways and American Air-
lines and Qatar’s threat to exit the oneworld alliance to provide a re-
cent example of the risks of alliances 
 
* = Publication date in brackets; AR = Annual report; IA = Industry analysis; Mag = Magazine 
article; NP = Newspaper; PR = Press release; Web = Corporate website 
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